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We study competitive equilibria in a signalling economy with heterogeneously informed buyers.
In terms of the classic Spence (1973, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 87, 355––374) model of job
market signalling, firms have access to direct but imperfect information about worker types, in addition
to observing their education. Firms can be ranked according to the quality of their information, i.e., their
expertise. In equilibrium, some high-type workers forgo signalling and are hired by better informed firms,
which make positive profits. Workers’ education decisions and firms’ use of their expertise are strategic
complements, allowing for multiple equilibria that can be Pareto ranked. We characterize wage dispersion
and the extent of signalling as a function of the distribution of expertise among firms. Our model can also
be applied to a variety of other signalling problems, including securitization, corporate financial structure,
insurance markets, or dividend policy.
Key words: Asymmetric information, expertise, signaling, competitive equilibrium.
JEL Codes: D5, D8, G1, G3, J3, L1, M5
1. INTRODUCTION
We study competitive markets with the following features: sellers are privately informed about
their own type; they can take a publicly observable action that is differentially costly for different
types; buyers can directly observe imperfect information about sellers’ types; and the quality of
this information is heterogeneous across buyers. The first two features define a standard signalling
environment.1 Our objective is to move beyond the special case, studied extensively, where
buyers are completely uninformed and rely exclusively on the public signal to form beliefs about
sellers’ types. Instead, we investigate the effect of adding the third and fourth features, buyers’
heterogeneous direct information, on equilibrium prices and allocations. Our running example
is an extension of the canonical Spence (1973) model of job market signalling: workers have
1. Throughout, we refer to a signalling rather than a screening problem. Traditionally, which term is used depends
on which party proposes contract terms. Since in our setup there are markets for all possible contracts, the distinction
vanishes.


































































































Copyedited by: ES MANUSCRIPT CATEGORY: Article
[19:28 2/11/2020 OP-REST200072.tex] RESTUD: The Review of Economic Studies Page: 2 1–50
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private information about their own productivity; education is purely wasteful but is more costly
for less productive workers so it can be used to signal; and firms have heterogeneous expertise in
directly assessing workers’ productivities, in addition to verifying their education. For instance,
firms have access to such direct information through tests, interviews, referrals or trial periods,
and differ in their ability to extract accurate predictions from them. We ask how differences in
recruiting expertise across firms affect the equilibrium: what wages do more- versus less-expert
firms offer, which workers do they hire, how much profit do they make, what education levels do
they require, and what are the implications for social welfare?
While we present our setup and results in terms of this application, our model is general
and can be used to answer these basic questions for many signalling and screening problems.
How do investors’ abilities to directly assess a company’s profitability affect IPO prices,
incentives for insiders to retain undiversified shareholdings, and the payment of dividends?
What are firms’ incentives to engage in costly brand-building or to offer warranties if
consumers have heterogeneous ability to find out about product quality directly, e.g., by
studying product reviews? How does the use of different risk assessment models across
insurance companies affect equilibrium deductibles and premiums? What are the effects of
asset managers’ heterogeneous pricing techniques on the design and tranching of asset-
backed securities? Returning to labour markets, we focus on the most parsimonious setting
with two worker types and consider configurations for firms’ direct information that allow
us to rank firms by their expertise, i.e., their probability of making mistakes: the “false
positives” case where firms may observe good signals from low-productivity workers and the
opposite case, with “false negatives.” We assume that each firm hires a single worker; such
capacity constraints are crucial to rule out trivial solutions where the most-expert firms hire all
workers.
Our first task is to define a notion of competitive equilibrium that applies to this environment.
We assume that each combination of a wage and an education level defines a separate market. Any
worker is allowed to apply for a job in any market (provided he acquires the level of education
prescribed by that market) and any firm can recruit in any market. For workers, markets are
partially exclusive: naturally, they commit to a single education level but can apply for jobs at
many different wages. When hiring, firms need not hire randomly from the pool of applicants:
they can reject some applicants and only hire from among those they find acceptable, but only
to the extent that their own direct information allows them to tell workers apart. Markets do
not necessarily clear: in any given market, workers can apply for jobs and not get them and
firms may not find acceptable workers. Equilibrium requires that workers’ expectations of their
chances of finding work in each market and firms’ beliefs about what workers they will encounter
in each market be consistent with each other and with firm recruiting and worker education
decisions.
As is common in signalling models, the set of equilibria depends on what beliefs agents
can entertain regarding markets where in equilibrium there is no trade. A crucial technical
contribution of this paper is to construct restrictions on these out-of-equilibrium beliefs that
deliver a unique and plausible equilibrium in the familiar uninformed-buyers benchmark, yet still
guarantee equilibrium existence and tractability in the general case of heterogeneous expertise.
We propose the following conditions: first, for any market where a firm has well-defined beliefs
about what acceptable workers it would encounter, these beliefs can only place weight on workers
who would find it (weakly) optimal to apply to that market. Second, if a firm does not have well-
defined beliefs about acceptable workers it would encounter, we impose that any workers that
would be acceptable to the firm must expect that, if they were to apply for a job in that market,
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For the benchmark where firms have no direct information, our definition ensures that the
least-cost separating allocation is the unique equilibrium. Our refinement implies that pooling is
inconsistent with equilibrium: at slightly higher education levels than a putative pooling allocation,
firms must believe that they will only encounter high type workers because they are the ones most
willing to choose higher education, and therefore firms could profitably deviate.
For the false positives case, the following “partial signalling” pattern emerges. Low worker
types get no education and high types get either no education or enough education to fully
separate. Firms with sufficiently accurate information recruit zero-education workers at a wage
wP that leaves high-productivity workers indifferent between signalling and not signalling, and
make positive profits. These firms face both high- and low-productivity applicants, so they can
only profit if they are able to reject a sufficient proportion of low types. Firms with less accurate
information recruit either educated workers at a wage equal to the high types’ productivity, or
zero-education workers at a wage equal to low types’ productivity, and make zero profits in
either case. Two simple conditions summarize any equilibrium: an indifference condition that
requires the marginal firm to make zero profits by hiring zero-education workers at wage wP, and
a market-clearing condition requiring high-type workers who forgo education to indeed find jobs
at wage wP. This tractable structure allows us, for instance, to study comparative statics. We find
that signalling decreases if the cost is higher, if the demand for workers increases, or if firms’
expertise improves, intuitive properties that, somewhat unappealingly, cannot be obtained in the
standard signalling model with uninformed firms.
Our model features strategic complementarities between high-quality workers’ signalling
decisions and firms’ recruiting decisions. If enough high productivity workers forgo education,
the pool of applicants in zero-education markets improves. This induces less-expert firms to
recruit zero-educated workers, which in turn allows more high-type workers to forgo education.
As a result, the model may feature multiple equilibria, each with different proportions of high
types choosing to forgo education. The least cost-separating allocation, where all high types get
enough education to separate, is always one of these equilibria: if all high types signal, there is
no hope to hire them without requiring the signal, and therefore firms’ expertise is useless—an
extreme form of coordination failure. More generally, when there are multiple equilibria, they can
be Pareto ranked. The signal is a pure deadweight cost, and the equilibrium with less signalling
is preferred by everyone.
One feature of the classic signalling and screening model that has been criticized is a
discontinuity as the buyers’ prior becomes degenerate. The symmetric information case involves
no signalling, but in the presence of even a minimal mass of low types, the high types must
emit a non-trivial signal to separate. Our model offers a natural way to smooth out this stark
property: there always exists an equilibrium that continuously approaches the full information
limit, both as the share of low types vanishes and as buyers’ direct information becomes perfect.
A similar discontinuity arises in the standard signalling model when the signalling costs of
the two types converge: whenever the costs differ, there is a discrete amount of signalling,
but no signalling when they are equal. We show that our model overcomes this discontinuity
as well.
Finally, we characterize equilibrium in the false negatives case, which we show to be essentially
unique. Productive workers now make different choices depending on how transparent they are,
that is, how many firms are able to identify them as high types. Those most easily identified forgo
education and are paid their productivity. Less transparent workers also forgo education but now
earn a range of lower wages. They are hired in part by non-selective firms in markets where low
types also apply, so wages must be low enough to allow these non-selective firms to break even
on whatever pool of applicants they face. The least transparent productive workers instead resort
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of wage dispersion among equally productive (and educated) workers based on how easy it is to
evaluate their productivities. It also predicts that higher demand for workers leads to polarization
in signalling: fewer high types signal, but those who signal do so more intensely.
1.1. Related literature
This article introduces heterogeneous expertise among buyers into the canonical competitive
signalling and screening environments due to Spence (1973) and Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976).
To this purpose, we develop a notion of equilibrium that builds on concepts proposed by Gale
(1996), Guerrieri et al. (2010), Guerrieri and Shimer (2014), and Kurlat (2016), all of which are
based on the idea that different prices define different markets and the probability of trade is
the market-clearing variable. This allows us to naturally incorporate capacity constraints among
buyers and to study the extensive margin of trade, which is crucial in many relevant settings, such
as labour or financial markets.
The way in which we model heterogeneity of information on the buyers’ side—and hence
their ability to distinguish between sellers based on their own direct assessment rather than just
the publicly observable signal or screening device—is borrowed directly from Kurlat (2016).
However, Kurlat (2016) studies a single-dimensional environment, where the set of contracts
is just the set of prices, so public signalling is ruled out. Our paper instead incorporates a
second dimension, allowing us to capture signalling or screening through, for example, education,
underinsurance, equity retention, dividends, or advertising. On a technical side, incorporating
signalling requires us to model buyers’ beliefs associated with off-equilibrium actions, a challenge
that we tackle here but that is not present in Kurlat (2016). Similar to our article, Gale (1996)
and Guerrieri et al. (2010) also allow for general, multidimensional contracts. Relative to them,
however, our contribution is to relax the assumption that buyers are completely and uniformly
uninformed, by introducing heterogeneous information for buyers.
The refinement on beliefs that we impose is closely related to the D1 criterion proposed by
Cho and Kreps (1987), the condition for a refined equilibrium proposed by Gale (1996), and
the conditions on beliefs imposed by Guerrieri et al. (2010) for contracts that are not traded in
equilibrium. It is based on the idea that, in markets with zero supply in equilibrium, buyers
anticipate that, if they were to place demand there, they would only attract the sellers (among
those they do not reject based on their direct assessment) who are willing to accept the lowest
probability of trade. This is the natural generalization of the infinite-tightness condition imposed
by Guerrieri et al. (2010) to our framework with heterogeneous information. The refinement
eliminates the traditional reasons for multiplicity that emerge in signalling games when out-of-
equilibrium beliefs are left unrestricted. By contrast, the multiplicity we find in the false positives
case is due to an entirely orthogonal force, namely the strategic complementary between signalling
and the use of expertise, which vanishes in the classic no-information benchmark.
More broadly, our work relates to the literature that followed Rothschild and Stiglitz
(1976) on competition in multidimensional contracts with asymmetric information (see e.g.
Miyazaki, 1977; Wilson, 1977; Dubey and Geanakoplos, 2002; Bisin and Gottardi, 2006;
Netzer and Scheuer, 2014; Azevedo and Gottlieb, 2017). Similarly, there is an extensive literature
that has applied the Spence (1973) signalling model to various settings, including corporate
finance (Leland and Pyle, 1977; Ross, 1977), dividend policy (Bhattacharya, 1979; Bernheim,
1991), security design (DeMarzo and Duffie, 1999; DeMarzo, 2005), and brand-building (Nelson,
1974; Kihlstrom and Riordan, 1984; Milgrom and Roberts, 1986), to name a few. None of these
two strands of literature, however, have attempted to move beyond the polar case where sellers are
informed and buyers are uninformed. Our article provides a general analysis of how heterogeneous
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Daley and Green (2014) also study an environment where the possibility of signalling coexists
with direct information (“grades”) and find conditions such that the equilibrium features either
partial or complete pooling. They assume that grades are equally observable by all firms, so they
have no role for expertise on the firm side. Feltovich et al. (2002) also consider an environment
with (homogeneous) direct information in addition to signalling, and find that—in a model with
three types—the highest types may refrain from signalling to distinguish themselves from the
medium types, a behaviour they refer to as “countersignalling.” A similar feature emerges in our
model in the false negatives case, where some high types separate through signalling while others
pool with low types in terms of the signal they emit, relying instead on expert buyers to identify
them. Fishman and Parker (2015), Bolton et al. (2016), and Kurlat (2019) study environments
where buyers can differ in the quality of their information but where sellers do not have a way to
signal. Their focus is on the efficiency of buyers’ information acquisition decision.
Board et al. (2017) share our interest in the idea that firms differ in their ability to tell apart
high- and low-quality job applicants. In their setup, however, workers do not make any decisions,
so whether or not they know their own productivity does not matter. This rules out any way in
which workers may signal their private information, or be screened other than through firms’
direct assessment of them. Instead, in our model, workers can emit a publicly observable signal,
such as education, that can be used to convey information about their productivity. In addition,
Board et al. (2017) assume that firms’ direct information is independent across firms, whereas
we work with a nested information structure where more-expert buyers know strictly more than
less-expert ones.
The rest of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and briefly
illustrates a number of well-known applications. Section 3 provides our equilibrium definition
and Section 4 shows that it gives rise to a unique equilibrium in the standard signalling environment
where firms are uninformed. In Section 5, we characterize the set of equilibria with false positives
and in Section 6 the case of false negatives. Finally, Section 7 concludes. Various extensions and
all proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2. THE ECONOMY
Our model is intended to capture a generic signalling setting. For clarity, we present our results in
terms of Spence’s original job market signalling model. However, the only critical assumptions
are perfect competition, heterogeneous information, and the existence of some action (the signal)
that is inefficient from a first-best point of view but involves different costs for different sellers.
Our results therefore apply to any setting with these features, and we provide some alternative
interpretations of the model below.
2.1. Job market signalling
There is a unit measure of workers indexed by i, uniformly distributed in the interval [0,1]. Each






with qL <qH . Workers with i<λ and i≥λ are low and high types, respectively. A worker’s
index i is private information. Workers of the same type but different indices i all have the same
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Workers can choose a publicly observable level of education e, which has no effect on their






We assume cL >cH , so low types experience a higher utility cost of obtaining education.
Up to here, the model coincides with the Spence (1973) signalling model. Our innovation is
to introduce firms’ heterogeneous information about the workers they encounter. Formally, there
is a continuum of firms of measure greater than one, indexed by θ ∈ [0,1]. The measure of firms






If θ =λ, this signal allows the firm to perfectly infer the worker’s productivity. If θ <λ, the firm
makes “false positive” mistakes: it observes positive signals from a subset of the low-type workers.
If θ >λ, the firm makes “false negative” mistakes. We assume that firms can be perfectly ranked
by their expertise, so one of two cases applies: either F has support in [0,λ] or it has support
in [λ,1]. For instance, firms can be interpreted as being “bold” in the first and “cautious” in
the second case.2 Clearly, (2) is a restrictive model of how well informed firms are: in general,
firms could make both kinds of mistakes in arbitrarily correlated ways. This formulation has the
advantage of providing a natural measure of a firm’s expertise since the closer θ is to λ, the better
the firm is at correctly identifying a worker’s productivity.
Each firm can hire at most one worker. Equivalently, we could assume that buyers have
limited funds (and are unable to borrow) to leverage their expertise, which may be more natural
in some of our financial market applications sketched below. Either way, some form of capacity
constraints are needed to keep the problem interesting by preventing the best-informed buyers
from implementing all trades. If a firm hires worker i at wage w, its profits are q(i)−w.
Thus, our key innovation compared to the canonical signalling model is that buyers have
access to direct, even though imperfect, information about sellers, rather than relying exclusively
on self-selection. Moreover, the quality of this information is heterogeneous.3 For example,
some managers have better judgement in assessing the talent of job applicants, as in Board et al.
(2017), or recruiters may run tests or interviews (see e.g. Guasch and Weiss, 1980; Lockwood,
1991). Another channel of direct information about workers is through referrals. For example,
Beaman and Magruder (2012) and Burks et al. (2015) show empirically that better employees
make more and better referrals, and that firms differ in the degree to which their employees can
predict the performance of their referrals.
2.2. Other interpretations
As is common to signalling models, the crucial feature is that the signal e is costly and satisfies a
single-crossing property. For the job market signalling application, single crossing can be verified
2. See Farboodi and Kondor (2018) for a model that links these two cases to the business cycle.
3. Whenever there is no heterogeneity across firms (so the support of F is concentrated at a single value of θ ), our
model collapses back to the standard signalling problem. If θ <λ, then all workers i∈[0,θ ) are fully identified as low
types, and all i∈[θ,1] look indistinguishable to all firms. Hence, the former group of workers get their first-best outcome,
and a standard signalling model without expertise applies to the latter population, with a share of low types equal to
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which is higher for low types. There are many other signalling settings that are formally isomorphic
to our baseline model. We briefly describe four of them.
2.2.1. Securitization. Consider first the security design problem of DeMarzo and Duffie
(1999). A continuum i∈ [0,1] of originators each own a pool of assets that generate future cash flow
y. The distribution of these cash flows is privately known to the originators, and given by GL(y) if
i<λ and GH (y) if i≥λ, where GH first-order stochastically dominates GL , and they have common
support. The originators prefer receiving cash over holding their risky assets, for instance because
they have access to other profitable investment opportunities, or because they have superior ability
in valuing assets and therefore want to raise cash to fund new asset purchases. Formally, they
value future cash flows from their unissued assets at discount factor α<1. They face a pool of
small, heterogeneously informed, buyers who do not discount, so the efficient allocation calls for
selling all assets. Of course, due to their private information, the originators face a lemons problem
when selling their assets. To raise cash, they therefore issue a limited-liability security backed by
their assets. DeMarzo and Duffie (1999) show that, under general conditions, it is optimal to sell
a high-quality, senior claim to the assets (i.e. debt) and retain the remaining, risky equity tranche
as “skin in the game,” i.e. a signal of asset quality. Let Y denote the upper bound of Gk , k =L,H;
let Y −e denote the face value of the debt tranche, and w denote its price per unit of face value.
Then issuer i’s payoff is u(e,w)=(Y −e)w+α
∫
max{y+e−Y ,0}dGk (y), with k =L if i<λ and
k =H if i≥λ. The marginal rate of substitution is −
∂u(e,w)/∂e
∂u(e,w)/∂w
= w−α[1−Gk(Y−e)]Y−e . By first-order
stochastic dominance (FOSD), this is higher for low types and therefore satisfies single crossing.
Finally, suppose each buyer demands one unit of face value of the asset-backed security. Then the








because each unit of the security has face value Y −e, so buying one unit of face value means
buying 1/(Y −e) securities.
Our model thus captures the equilibrium in this classic tranching problem with the additional
feature that buyers are heterogeneously informed about the quality of the asset-backed security.
This may involve differential knowledge of aspects of the underlying asset pool or, more
importantly, special expertise in the pricing of these securities (such as proprietary pricing
models). For instance, Bernardo and Cornell (1997) provide empirical evidence for significant
variation in valuations of mortgage-backed securities (with the winning bid exceeding the median
bid by over 17% on average) even though all buyers in their data were sophisticated investors or
intermediaries. They conclude that this variability is due to differences in pricing technology (see
also Eisfeldt et al., 2019). Mattey and Wallace (2001) document heterogeneity of this variability
across different mortgage-backed securities, suggesting that some securities are easier to price
than others.
2.2.2. Financial structure of firms. Our next example is a variant of the corporate
finance problem studied by Leland and Pyle (1977). Each entrepreneur i owns a project whose
future payoff, privately known, is given by (1). As in the previous example, entrepreneurs are
impatient, so their own valuation for their project’s return is αq(i), and they wish to sell their
project to heterogeneously informed investors. To signal the quality of their project, entrepreneurs
can publicly announce that they will retain a fraction e of the equity of their firm. If an entrepreneur
sells a fraction 1−e of his firm at a price per unit of w then his utility will be w(1−e)+αq(i)e. The





1−e which, again, is higher for low types. If
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information among investors could be the result of differential experience in this particular
industry, differential contacts with company insiders, or differential access to analyst reports,
which make some investors better than others at distinguishing good from bad projects.4
2.2.3. Insurance. Our model can also be mapped into the Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976)
insurance problem. A continuum i∈ [0,1] of risk-averse households each have wealth X
and will suffer a loss of d with probability 1−q(i). q(i) is given by (1) and is privately
known to the household. They face a pool of small, risk-neutral, heterogeneously informed
insurance companies, so the efficient allocation calls for households to be fully insured.
Insurance companies offer policies that cover the loss d minus a deductible e, in exchange
for an up-front premium (1−w)(d−e), so that 1−w is the implicit probability of loss
that makes the insurance contract actuarially fair. If a household gets contract (e,w), its
utility is u(e,w)=qv(X −(1−w)(d−e))+(1−q)v(X −(1−w)(d−e)−e), where v(·) is the














. It is straightforward to show
that this is decreasing in q and therefore satisfies single crossing. If an insurance company
covers one unit of losses from household i at an implicit probability 1−w, then its profits are
1−w−(1−q(i))=q(i)−w.5 Heterogeneous information among insurance companies could be
the result of some of them having larger actuarial databases or more sophisticated predictive
models that allow them to tell apart riskier from safer types.
2.2.4. Dividend policy. Finally, consider the dividend puzzle, which observes that firms
pay dividends even though their tax treatment is less favourable than that of share repurchases. The
dividend signalling hypothesis (going back to Bhattacharya, 1979) explains this corporate payout
policy by viewing dividends as a costly signal to convey private information about profitability
(see e.g. Bernheim and Wantz, 1995, for empirical evidence). Formally, suppose a continuum
i∈ [0,1] of firms will each produce a random, i.i.d. stream of cash flows {yt}
∞
t=1. The distribution
of y is privately known to the incumbent shareholder and given by GL(y) if i<λ and GH (y) if i≥λ,
where GH first-order stochastically dominates GL . The conditional means are Ei (y)=rq(i), where
r is the interest rate and q(i) is given by (1). The incumbent shareholder announces a dividend
e to be paid at t =1 and then sells all its shares (cum-dividend) to heterogeneously informed
outside investors. Dividends are taxed at a rate τ . Furthermore, following Bhattacharya (1979), if
the cash flow y1 is less than the announced dividend e, the incumbent agrees to provide the firm
with a loan to finance the shortfall, at a cost β(e−y1). Letting w−τe denote the price paid by
investors, the payoff for the incumbent shareholder is u(e,w)=w−τe−β
∫ e
0 (e−y)dGk (y) with




By FOSD, this is higher for low types and thus satisfies single crossing. An outside investor’s
profit is given by the net present value of the firm’s cash flows q(i) minus the dividend tax τe
minus the price paid w−τe, for a total of q(i)−w, just like in the benchmark model.
4. Leland and Pyle (1977) model the cost of retention as risk-bearing by a risk-averse entrepreneur, rather than
reduced investment by an entrepreneur who can reinvest his proceeds from selling the project at an above-market rate
of return r =1/α−1>0, as we do here following DeMarzo and Duffie (1999). Though the interpretation is similar, the
mechanics in Leland and Pyle’s model are therefore closer to the Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) insurance application we
sketch below.
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3. EQUILIBRIUM
We adopt a Walrasian approach similar to the notion of competitive search equilibrium. There are
many (non-exclusive) markets open simultaneously, each defined by a required signal e∈R+ and
a wage w∈[0,qH ], and there is no guarantee for either workers or firms of finding a counterparty
in a market they visit.
3.1. Worker’s problem
Worker i first chooses a signal e and then applies for jobs. This aligns well with the natural timing,
where education is determined before entering the labour market. Similarly, in the corporate
finance applications, it corresponds to situations where the design of the security (the size of the
junior tranche), the financial structure of the firm (the retained equity) or the amount of dividends
to be paid out are determined first, and then the securities or firm shares are offered, potentially
in multiple markets with different unit prices.
A worker is allowed to apply to all the markets that require his chosen signal e. We assume
that, for any given signal e, markets at different wages clear sequentially, starting from the highest
wage, as in the “buyer’s equilibrium” studied by Wilson (1980). Therefore, a worker starts by
applying to market (e,qH) and, as long as he has not been hired, continues to apply to lower-
wage markets. Eventually, he gets hired in market (e,w), and does not apply to markets with
lower wages. The worker understands that each choice of e is associated with some probability






wdµ(w;e,i) is the expected wage. We denote the choice of worker i by ei.
3.2. Firm’s problem
When a firm observes applicants, it may use its information to select which ones to hire, to the
extent that it can tell them apart. A feasible hiring rule for firm θ is a function χ : [0,1]→{0,1}









. A firm will reject applicants with χ (i)=0 and hire workers (which we describe as
χ -acceptable) from the set Iχ ={i∈ [0,1] :χ (i)=1}. Let X denote the set of possible hiring
rules.
A firm must decide what market to hire from and what hiring rule to apply (it is without
loss of generality to assume the firm hires only in one market and uses only one rule). To make
this decision, the firm needs to form beliefs G(·;e,w,χ) about what workers it will be drawing
from should it choose to hire in market (e,w) with hiring rule χ . If the firm thinks it will find
χ -acceptable workers in market (e,w), then G(·;e,w,χ) is a probability measure on Iχ ; otherwise




=0. Let g denote the density or p.m.f. of G, which we







dG(i;e,w,χ) s.t. χ feasible for θ.






































































































Copyedited by: ES MANUSCRIPT CATEGORY: Article
[19:28 2/11/2020 OP-REST200072.tex] RESTUD: The Review of Economic Studies Page: 10 1–50
10 REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
3.3. Consistency of wage distributions









, signals E0 ⊆R
+ and hiring rules X0 ⊆X , demand is the total
number of firms who make those choices:
D(E0,W0,X0)≡
∫
I(eθ ∈E0)I(wθ ∈W0)I(χθ ∈X0)dF (θ). (3)
We then impose the following consistency condition on firms’ hiring and the distribution of wage





g(i;e,w̃,χ)dD(e,w̃,χ) for all e,w,i.
The indicator I(ei =e) takes the value 1 if worker i chooses signal e and zero otherwise; µ(w;e,i)
is his probability of getting a wage at most w. Hence, the left-hand side of Condition 1 is the total
number of i-type workers with signal e who will obtain wages at most w. Moreover, since beliefs
are rational, a firm imposing hiring rule χ in market (e,w) will hire g(i;e,w,χ) workers of type
i. Adding these hires across all hiring rules and wages below w using the demand measure results
in the right-hand side of Condition 1, which is the total number of i-type workers hired in markets
with signal e and wages up to w.
Condition 1 simplifies when i-type workers choose signal e (so I(ei =e)=1), and they have
strictly positive probability of finding a job at wage w, so the c.d.f. µ makes a discrete step of
size dµ(w;e,i). Then, Condition 1 can be written as:
dµ(w;e,i)=
∫
X g(i;e,w,χ )dD(e,w,χ )
I(ei =e)
. (4)
This is the standard rationing rule under frictionless matching, by which the probability dµ for
an i-type worker of finding a job at wage w is equal to the ratio of i-type workers demanded
by firms in that market over their supply, which is equal to 1.6 The more general formulation
of Condition 1 also deals with cases where µ may increase continuously over some interval of
wages, so the probability of being hired in any single market is zero but there is an associated
probability density. Both situations will occur in the equilibria we find below.
Example 1 To illustrate the meaning of equations (3) and (4), consider the following example.
There are three types of workers i∈{A,B,C}, each of mass one, who choose signal e, and three
firm types θ ∈{α,β,γ } who hire in markets that require e. The measures of each type of firm, the
wage at which they recruit, their hiring rules, and beliefs are:
6. Note that equation (4) and Condition 1 rule out a situation with excess demand for a type of worker because
it would imply a job-finding probability higher than one. In other words, in any given active market, the firm-to-worker
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Firm θ α β γ
Measure f (θ) 0.5 1 1.5
Wage wθ wH wH wL
Hiring rule
χθ (A) 1 1 1
χθ (B) 0 1 1
χθ (C) 0 0 1
Beliefs
g(A;e,wθ ,χθ ) 1 0.5 0
g(B;e,wθ ,χθ ) 0 0.5 1/3
g(C;e,wθ ,χθ ) 0 0 2/3
Firms of type α and β hire at wage wH . Type-α firms only hire i=A workers while type-β firms
hire type i=A and i=B workers. Type-γ firms hire at wage wL , and they accept everyone. For
now, we take firms’ beliefs simply as given and will show below how they are derived. Given
beliefs and firms’ demand decisions, we can compute workers’ probabilities of being hired at



































































In words, type-A workers get hired for sure at wage wH , type-B workers get hired with probability
0.5 at wage wH and probability 0.5 at wage wL , and type-C workers get hired for sure at wage
wL .
Condition 1 imposes no constraints on µ when I(ei =e)=0, i.e., no constraints on i-workers’
chances of being hired in markets where there are no i-applicants. For these markets, we impose
the condition:
Condition 2 µ is weakly decreasing in i
Condition 2 says that higher-i workers expect higher wages in a FOSD sense. This rules out
low types being more optimistic than high types about the wages they would obtain for some
off-equilibrium signals. This condition can be derived from more primitive assumptions. Suppose
workers believe that firms which hire in markets with off-equilibrium signals use optimal hiring
rules. These are weakly monotonic: no firm finds it optimal to accept worker i while rejecting
worker i′ > i. If firms draw workers randomly from those that satisfy their hiring rule (as discussed
in the next section), applying Condition 1 to off-equilibrium signals implies that higher types will
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3.4. Consistency of beliefs
Consider a firm that hires in market (e,w) with hiring rule χ . The pool of workers available for hire
in this market includes i-type workers only if they choose education e and have not already been
hired at higher wages. Therefore, it includes I(ei =e)µ(w;e,i) i-type workers. If firms simply
chose at random from the χ -acceptable subset of this pool, then Bayes’ Rule would imply that




i I(ei =e)χ (i)µ(w;e,i)di
, (5)
However, if firms with different hiring rules hire sequentially in the same market, firms that
hire earlier skew the pool that later firms face, so rational beliefs depend on the order in which
firms hire within a market. Kurlat (2016) assumes that there exist separate markets for each wage
combined with each possible way of ordering rules, and firms and workers choose which markets
to trade in, making the order endogenous. He shows that under “false positives” information, less
selective firms hire first. This implies that no one’s sample is skewed by earlier firms, so it is as
if all firms were drawing from the entire pool of χ -acceptable applicants, and (5) applies.
Example 2 Continuing on Example 1, we illustrate how to derive firms’ beliefs using (5) and
workers’ hiring probabilities computed above. In market (e,wH ), both firms of type α and β hire,
but β-firms get to pick first. Since all three worker types apply in this market but firms of type β








This means that the unit measure of type-β firms hire a total of half a type-A and half a type-B









Hence, the measure 0.5 of type-α firms hires the remaining half type-A worker. Finally, firms of
type γ hire in market (e,wL) accepting all applicants. Since type-A workers have been hired for
sure at the higher wage wH , they are no longer applying at wL , so g(A;e,wL,χγ )=0. γ -firms
















As a result, the 1.5 measure of type-γ firms hire all the remaining workers.
Instead, under “false negatives” information, Kurlat (2016) shows that there may be markets
where more selective firms hire first, and (5) does not apply. However, this possibility only arises
among firms who only accept high types. Therefore, even if early firms skew the pool, later firms
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Condition 3 If
∫





i q(i)I(ei =e)χ (i)µ(w;e,i)di
∫
i I(ei =e)χ (i)µ(w;e,i)di
.
Condition 3 says that beliefs must be such that the average productivity that firms expect to get
if they hire in market (e,w) with hiring rule χ must be the same as if they were drawing from the
entire pool. For the false positives case, it holds because it is implied by (5). For the false negatives
case, it holds because the only cases where (5) might not hold are when firms only accept high
type workers. Rather than explicitly allowing for endogenous ordering of firms’ trades and re-
deriving these results, we incorporate them directly into our definition of equilibrium by imposing
Condition 3.
Example 3 Continuing further on Examples 1 and 2, suppose that workers of type A and B
have productivity qH while worker type C has productivity qL . If less selective firms hire first,
as assumed in Example 2, then by Bayes’ rule, firms α and β expect average quality qH , while
firm γ expects average quality (2qL +qH )/3, so Condition 3 applies. Suppose now, by contrast,
that more selective firms hire first, so firm α gets to pick workers before firm β in market (e,wH ).
Since firm α hires half a type-A worker first, this skews firm β’s remaining applicant sample, and















which violates equation (5). Nonetheless, since both workers A and B have quality qH , firm β
expects average quality qH , so Condition 3 remains satisfied.
Condition 3 only applies to markets where the denominator is positive, i.e., where there are
χ -acceptable workers. The key challenge in constructing a tractable equilibrium notion is how
to discipline firms’ beliefs in markets that are empty of χ -acceptable workers. We propose a
refinement which guarantees equilibrium uniqueness in the no-information benchmark, and at
the same time preserves equilibrium existence throughout.7 For markets in which no χ -acceptable
workers apply, there are two possibilities: either the firm nevertheless believes it could find χ -
acceptable workers and G(·;e,w,χ) is a well-defined probability measure, or the firm believes





For the first case, we require that beliefs only place weight on χ -acceptable workers that
would in fact be willing to look for a job in market (e,w). In other words, a firm can never expect
to find in market (e,w) a worker who could obtain higher utility by choosing a different signal,
or who can find a job for sure with the same signal but a higher wage. Formally, we require:
Condition 4 For any i in the support of G(·;e,w,χ):
1. χ (i)=1
7. This issue does not arise in Kurlat (2016). He only studies unidimensional contracts, where the price is the only
contract dimension. This rules out signalling, and thus there are no markets corresponding to off-equilibrium signals, and
no need to specify how beliefs react to these off-equilibrium signals. In his setup, beliefs must satisfy Condition 3, but
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2. e solves worker i’s problem
3. µ(w;e,i)>0
The alternative is that a firm is certain that it cannot find χ -acceptable workers in market (e,w).
We impose that a firm can only reach that conclusion if guaranteeing χ -acceptable workers a job
with a wage at least w is not enough to persuade them to choose signal e. Formally, we impose:




=0, then µ(w;e,i)=0 for all i such that χ (i)=1.
Conditions 4 and 5 are closely related to the infinite-tightness condition in Guerrieri et al.
(2010) and Guerrieri and Shimer (2014). In their setup, for every market there either is at least
one worker type who finds that market optimal, or the market tightness is infinite. In the first
case, this allows firms to have well-defined beliefs about which workers they would encounter; in
the second, workers would match for sure. Conditions 4 and 5 generalize this idea by imposing
it separately for each χ -acceptance group. For each χ , it has to be the case that either some
χ -acceptable worker finds visiting this market optimal (in which case this worker can be in the
support of well-defined beliefs) or all χ -acceptable workers are guaranteed jobs. Within a given
market, which of these possibilities applies can be different across different hiring rules χ .
3.5. Equilibrium definition
We summarize the above discussion in the following equilibrium definition:
Definition 1 An equilibrium consists of (i) a signal ei for each worker i; (ii) a hiring decision
(eθ ,wθ ,χθ ) for each firm θ ; (iii) wage distributions µ(·;e,i); and (iv) beliefs G(·;e,w,χ) that
satisfy:
1. Worker optimization. ei solves worker i’s problem, taking µ as given.
2. Firm optimization. (eθ ,wθ ,χθ ) solves firm θ ’s problem, taking G as given.
3. Consistency. µ, G, (eθ ,wθ ,χθ ) and ei satisfy Conditions 1 to 5.
4. PURE SIGNALLING
We now characterize equilibrium for the case where F is a point mass at θ =0 (or equivalently at
θ =1), i.e. when all firms are completely uninformed. This corresponds to the classic signalling
environment. For this case, the least-cost separating allocation emerges as the unique equilibrium.






and each type is paid their own productivity, as illustrated in Figure 1.








e=e∗,w=qH ,χ (i)=1 for a measure λ of firms
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Figure 1






















I(i<λ) if e<e∗,w≥qL +cLe
1







The equilibrium is constructed by setting the distribution µ as a point mass at the lower envelope




and high types indifferent between any e≥e∗. Therefore, e=0 for low types and e=e∗ for high





only encounter low types above the lower envelope and no one at all below, and similarly for high
types above e∗. Hence there are no profits in any market, and firms are trivially optimizing. A
measure F(1)−1 remain inactive, for instance by choosing a market with e=0 and w<qL (and
selection rule χ (i)=1 for all i).
The key step in establishing uniqueness is to rule out pooling, i.e. markets with positive supply
of both high and low types. This follows the standard logic based on single crossing. If there was
pooling at a level of education e′, then high types would require a lower wage than low types to
be willing to choose e=e′+ǫ. Hence firms that consider hiring in a market with e=e′+ǫ and
a wage that leaves high types indifferent must believe that they will only encounter high types,
which for small ǫ must be more profitable than hiring at e′.
The types of deviations to pooling contracts that may lead to non-existence of a pure-strategy
equilibrium in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) are not profitable because each firm perceives itself
to be small.8 A job with e=0 and w=qH −cHe
∗+ǫ is strictly preferred to the equilibrium by all
workers and if a firm was large and could hire the entire population it could break the equilibrium
by offering to hire everyone in this market, which would be profitable for low values of λ. Here,
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if a small firm tries to hire in this market, it will not attract any high types, because they know
that they will be competing with all the low types for an infinitesimal chance to be hired and will
have to settle for w=qL if they are not. Formally, this is captured by the assumption that beliefs
do not depend on whether a firm decides to recruit in a particular market. This is the same logic
that leads to existence and uniqueness in Guerrieri et al. (2010).
5. FALSE POSITIVES
We now consider the case where F has full support on [0,λ] and is continuous. We start by
characterizing the equilibrium when workers do not have a way of signalling (“no signalling”).
Next, we characterize a class of possible equilibria (“partial signalling”) that involve signalling by
a fraction of the high types. We then show that any equilibrium must be either the pure signalling
equilibrium described in Section 4, a no signalling equilibrium or a partial signalling equilibrium,
and find conditions for each of them to arise.
5.1. No signalling
We now characterize the equilibrium for the case where workers are constrained to choose e=0,










In equilibrium, all high-type workers (and some low-type workers) are hired at some wage wN ,
and the low-type workers who fail to find a job at wage wN are hired at wage qL .
To understand the meaning of conditions (11) and (12), observe first that if firm θ hires at
wage wN and imposes hiring rule χθ (i)=I(i≥θ), it hires randomly from the interval [θ,1].
Therefore it ends up hiring a low type with probability λ−θ1−θ and a high type with probability
1−λ
1−θ . Its expected profits will be: (θ)=
(λ−θ)qL+(1−λ)qH
1−θ −w
N . Profits are increasing in θ : firms
whose information enables them to screen out a higher proportion of low types will be hiring
from a better pool of workers. Only firms that are sufficiently confident in their ability to tell
workers apart will be willing to hire in this market; they will make profits if and only if they are
above the cutoff θN defined by equation (12), which satisfies (θN )=0.





to hire all of them. Given that in expectation firm θ hires 1−λ1−θ high-type
workers, this means that θN must satisfy (11).9
9. Note that low-type workers do not guarantee themselves a job at wage wN since some of the firms hiring in this




hire in market at wage wN and accept worker i. Therefore, his probability















This probability is increasing in i since higher-i low types mislead more firms into hiring them at wage wN . It is equal to
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The following result, proved by Kurlat (2016), establishes that this is the unique equilibrium.
Proposition 2 If workers are constrained to choose e=0, there is a unique equilibrium where:
1. Firms with θ ≥θN hire at wage wN and other firms are indifferent between hiring at wage qL
or not hiring.
2. High types are hired at wN with probability 1.
3. Beliefs follow (5) for all w≥qL and are zero for lower wages.
Conditions (11) and (12) are the analogues of conditions (19) and (20) in Kurlat (2016). There are
four minor differences. First, Kurlat (2016) assumes that assets are divisible and the law of large
numbers applies, so he has exact pro-rata rationing instead of probabilistic rationing. Under risk
neutrality, this distinction does not matter. Second, he allows some sellers to have a positive value
for retaining the good, while we assume it to be zero so workers sell all their labour endowment
in equilibrium. Third, Kurlat (2016) assumes qL =0, so the one-price equilibrium he finds is
equivalent to the two-price equilibrium we have, where some low types trade at price qL . Finally,
he models buyers’ capacity constraints in terms of dollars rather than in terms of quantities, so
the price appears in the market-clearing condition.
Note that as F approaches a point mass at θ =0, then equations (11)–(13) imply that θN →0,




→1. If firms are uninformed and workers cannot signal,
then all workers get hired for sure at a wage equal to the average productivity. This is the pure
Akerlof (1970) outcome: all workers have the same reservation wage (zero) so there is no adverse
selection at the pooled price.
5.2. Partial signalling
In a partial signalling equilibrium, low-type workers choose e=0. They are hired with some
probability in at wage wP, defined by:
wP =qH −cHe
∗. (14)
and otherwise at wage qL . High-type workers choose either e=0 (and are hired for sure at wage
wP) or e=e∗ (and are hired for sure at wage qH , which gives them the same utility).





hiring rule χθ (i)=I[i≥θ ], it will hire a high type with probability
πP(1−λ)
λ−θ+πP(1−λ)





















(with high-type applicants only), or not hiring at all, since they make
zero profits in any case.




. For this to be true, it must be the case that they are sure they will find a job, since they
can always guarantee themselves the same utility by choosing e=e∗ and getting a job that pays
w=qH . This means that there must be enough firms above θ
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Figure 2
Indifference and market-clearing conditions for the false positives case.




. By the arguments above, each firm θ ≥θP hires
πP(1−λ)
λ−θ+πP(1−λ)





















The indifference condition (15) and the market-clearing condition (16) define two relationships
between the cutoff firm θP and the fraction of high types πP that forgo signalling. Both of these
relationships are downward sloping, as shown in Figure 2.
The indifference condition (15) is downward-sloping because if more high types decide to





less-informed firms to earn profits. The same is true for the market-clearing condition (16) because









by firms and by high-type workers. The more high types forgo education, the more









high-type workers can refrain from signalling.
The strategic complementarity implies that there can be multiple intersections of (15) and
(16), and possibly multiple partial signalling equilibria. This source of multiplicity is different
from the forces that may lead to multiplicity in Akerlof (1970) (where adverse selection depends
on the price) or in canonical signalling models (where different off-equilibrium beliefs can be self-
sustaining). Indeed, with our refinement on beliefs, the uninformed-firms benchmark has a unique
equilibrium (Proposition 1), as does the no-signalling case (Proposition 2). The multiplicity we
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Figure 3
Active markets in each class of equilibrium.
Note that a no-signalling equilibrium corresponds to a situation where the market-clearing
condition is above the indifference condition at π =1, as in Figure 2. This means that if π =1 (no
high types signal) there are more firms willing to hire at wP than the total mass of workers they
would accept. As a result, high-θ firms “bid up” the wage to wN >wP, leading some firms
to drop out until the number of firms willing to pay this wage equals the number of high-
type workers. Moreover, a pure signalling equilibrium is a special case of a partial signalling
equilibrium, with πP =0 and θP =λ. Figure 3 shows which markets are active in each class of
equilibrium.
5.3. Candidate equilibria
The following result establishes that any equilibrium must belong to one of the three cases
described above.
Proposition 3 Any equilibrium is of one of the three following types:
1. Pure signalling. Low types choose e=0 and high types choose e=e∗.




if and only if θ ≥θN .
θN and wN satisfy (11) and (12); and wN ≥wP.
3. Partial signalling. Low types choose e=0; a fraction πP of high types choose e=0 and the




if and only if θ ≥θP. πP and θP satisfy (15) and
(16).
The key to proving Proposition 3 is to establish that high and low types cannot coexist at any
level of education other than e=0, so there is no pooling at positive signalling levels. The logic
is similar, though somewhat subtler, to that in the uninformed-firms benchmark.
Suppose that low and high types coexisted in some market (e,w) with e>0, as illustrated





does not go through. Some firms hiring in market (e,w) may be
screening out low types, so low types’ expected wage with signal e could be lower than that of





(e,w). Instead, we can rule out pooling in market (e,w) by contradiction, as follows. There are
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Figure 4
Ruling out pooling at e>0.
apart perfectly), or the highest firm to hire in this market has θ <λ. In the first case, we arrive at




. This firm’s beliefs





preferable over market (e,w), leading to a contradiction. If instead the highest
firm that hires in market (e,w) has θ <λ, then any low-type worker in the range i∈ (θ,λ) has the
same chance of getting a job in market (e,w) as a high type. If this is so, then firm θ can apply the









over (e,w), so it can guarantee itself high types by hiring in this market, which
contradicts the premise that it hires in market (e,w).
5.4. Existence
So far, we have described the possible candidates for equilibrium but we have not proved that any
of them is actually an equilibrium. We now show that the candidate equilibria described above
may or may not actually be equilibria. We construct a class of possible deviations and derive
an easy-to-verify condition to determine whether these deviations are profitable. We then show
that checking this condition is sufficient to establish an equilibrium, and prove that at least one
equilibrium always exists.











only include high types.


















is illustrated in Figure 5. Worker i=θ is the lowest-i low-type











by getting a wage of either wP or qL with the equilibrium probabilities. For small but positive
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Figure 5
Beliefs for firm θ
encounter low types in e-markets. The reason is that since u(θ)<wP, worker i=θ will be willing
to choose e for a lower wage than high types would. Hence, one can specify beliefs such that
firm θ does not want to recruit at education level e. However, for large e that is no longer the






is defined by the intersection of
the equilibrium indifference curves of worker i=θ and high types. At education levels higher
than eDθ , firm θ can only believe that it will encounter exclusively high types, because high types
would be willing to choose these education levels for a lower wage than worker i=θ .






is similar to the cream-skimming deviations that are used to
break putative pooling equilibria in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) and related models, including
the uninformed-firms benchmark of Section 4. In candidate equilibria where some high types




, where they are pooled with low types.
Just like in the benchmark, the possible deviation involves peeling off high types by requiring
an action that is more costly for low types than for them. However, there are two important
differences.
First, unlike in the Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) model, purely local deviations do not work.
A firm cannot cream-skim the high types off a pooling contract by requiring a small amount of




pool at lower rates than high types, they
obtain lower utility. Therefore, they find deviations more attractive than high types as long as they
involve only a small amount of extra signalling. In order to repel the low types, the deviating firm
must require a sufficiently larger signal.
Second, in order to profit, the deviating firm must use both sources of information in
combination: direct assessment and signalling. A completely uninformed firm cannot profitably





must require e=e∗ and therefore pay at least qH to attract high types, at which point the deviation
is no longer profitable. In order to profitably deviate, a firm must possess sufficient expertise to be
able to reject the lowest-i low types directly and then rely on the signal to screen out the higher-i
low types.
A candidate partial pooling equilibrium can only be an equilibrium if, for every θ ∈ (θP,λ),
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Figure 6
Candidate equilibria that do or do not satisfy condition (19).




by hiring a mixture of workers at a lower wage. A similar logic
applies to the case of a no-signalling equilibrium. The following result determines when this
condition is satisfied in either case and establishes that checking against this possible deviation
is a sufficient condition for equilibrium existence.
Proposition 4 1. The pure signalling candidate equilibrium described in Proposition 3 part 1
is always an equilibrium.
2. Suppose θN and wN ≥wP satisfy equations (11) and (12) for a no-signalling candidate
equilibrium. Then the worker and firm decisions described in Proposition 3 part 2 are part of

















3. Suppose πP and θP satisfy equations (15) and (16) for a partial signalling candidate
equilibrium. Then the worker and firm decisions described in Proposition 3 part 3 are part of
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Figure 7
Types of equilibria depending on parameters
In sum, the pure signalling equilibrium, which coincides with the no-information benchmark,
always exists in our model. The reason is that πP =0, θP =λ always satisfies equations (15) and
(16) and condition (19) holds for θ =λ. Depending on parameters, additional equilibria may exist
where firms use their expertise.
It is easy to construct examples where a partial or no-signalling equilibrium does exist. Figure 6














, condition (19) fails for some θ >θP2 , so it is not an equilibrium.
10
5.5. Properties of the equilibrium
5.5.1. Equilibrium regions. Figure 7 illustrates what type of equilibrium arises in
different regions of the parameter space. As we change parameters, the possible outcomes of
the model span the range from pure signalling, via partial signalling, up to the no-signalling
allocations in Kurlat (2016).
Both panels plot the equilibrium regions as a function of a parameter A on the vertical axis that
shifts the distribution of firms F towards more expertise.11 We know from Proposition 4 that the
pure signalling equilibrium always exists, and it is indeed the only equilibrium for low enough
levels of expertise as captured by the parameter A. As the distribution of expertise improves (in
a FOSD sense), holding the other parameters fixed, first a partial signalling and finally a no-
signalling equilibrium emerges in addition. Hence, as firms become better informed, less costly
signalling is required. Moreover, we show formally in Appendix A that, in the region with a partial
signalling equilibrium, the share of high types 1−πP who signal also decreases with a FOSD
shift in expertise. Better tools for directly evaluating job applicants, firm shares, asset-backed
securities or insurance applicants reduce the need to signal through education, dividends, retained
equity tranches, or high deductibles, respectively. In this way, direct information substitutes for
traditional signalling.
A FOSD increase in F is isomorphic to an increase in demand where each firm hires 
workers instead of just one. This is because making firms more expert is equivalent to letting the
10. The example uses qH =1,qL =0.4,cH =0.9,cL =0.15,λ=0.6,f (θ)=0.5[sin(13.3(θ −λ)
0.4 +2.2π )+1]2.8.
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more expert firms hire more workers.12 Our model thus generates the plausible prediction that
more high types forgo signalling through education (or that the amount of retained equity falls)
in boom times (see Gee (2018) for descriptive evidence of this effect). This intuitive property is
absent when buyers are uninformed: in that case, pure signalling is always the only equilibrium
independent of demand. It is also absent in the no-signalling equilibrium where higher demand
just translates into higher wages.
The left panel shows that increasing the relative cost of signalling cH/cL has the same effects
as improving expertise on the type of equilibrium we find, holding the other parameters fixed
(including A).13 Moreover, we show in Appendix A that, within the class of partial signalling
equilibria, the amount of signalling 1−πP decreases with signalling costs. Hence, as signalling
gets more expensive, fewer high types signal. Note that the no-information benchmark, somewhat
unappealingly, does not have this property: all high types choose e=e∗ and e∗ does not depend
on cH , so high types do not respond to a higher cost of signalling by signalling less. Allowing
for heterogeneously informed firms overturns this counterintuitive feature: equilibrium forces do
lead workers to respond on the extensive margin.
Finally, in the right panel, we vary the share of low types on the horizontal axis. To do so
in a clean way, we reparametrize the model by assuming that the mass of low-type workers is
λ̂, distributed uniformly in the interval [0,λ], with a density λ̂λ ; correspondingly, the mass of
high types is 1− λ̂, distributed uniformly in the interval [λ,1] with a density 1−λ̂1−λ . Changes in λ̂
have the interpretation of changes in the fraction of low types, leaving their relative detectability
in the eyes of firms constant. We see that reducing the share of low types this way moves the
equilibrium from pure signalling to partial equilibrium and finally to no signalling.14 Indeed, we
show formally below that, as the share of low types becomes sufficiently small, a no-signalling
equilibrium must always emerge.
5.5.2. Continuity in the symmetric information, no-signalling, and no-information
limits. One counterintuitive feature of the uninformed-firms benchmark is that it is discon-
tinuous in the buyers’ prior. If all workers have the same productivity, there is no-information
asymmetry and no signalling in equilibrium. However, as soon as there is even an infinitesimal
mass of low types, high types will signal enough to separate. The following result shows that this
unappealing property vanishes in our model, as in Daley and Green (2014) where the presence
of exogenous information also avoids the discontinuity.
Proposition 5 1. Let F be any continuous measure with full support on [0,λ]. For low λ̂ there
is a no-signalling equilibrium with lim
λ̂→0
wN =qH .
2. Let F∗ be a mass point at θ =λ. For any continuous F sufficiently close to F∗ (under the total
variation distance), there exists a no-signalling equilibrium, and limF→F∗ w
N =qH .
One way to approach the symmetric information limit is by taking λ̂→0, since λ̂=0 implies
symmetric information. As λ̂→0, there is always a no-signalling equilibrium, and wN →qH .
Hence, this equilibrium smoothly approaches the symmetric information outcome. Pure signalling
is also an equilibrium for any positive λ̂, so the discontinuity does not go away entirely,





dθ =1, so changing  is equivalent to a
change in f (θ ).
13. The example in the graph uses qH =1,qL =0.4,λ=0.55 in addition to the linear specification of f (θ ) from
above.
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but the set of equilibria is lower hemi-continuous in λ̂. A second direction to approach the
symmetric information limit is making the distribution F approach a mass point at θ =λ, since
that limit also implies symmetric information. Again, a no-signalling equilibrium always exists
sufficiently close to the limit, so the set of equilibria is lower hemi-continuous in this dimension
as well.15
A second form of discontinuity in the uninformed-firms benchmark arises with respect to the
cost of signalling. For any cH/cL <1, high types will signal enough to fully separate, whereas
when cH/cL =1 the signal does not allow high types to separate and pooling allocations result.
The current model, instead, is lower hemi-continuous as cH/cL →1. In the opposite limit, as
signalling becomes cheap, the model reduces to the uninformed-firms benchmark.
Proposition 6 1. For cH/cL sufficiently close to 1, there is a no-signalling equilibrium.
2. For cH/cL sufficiently close to 0, only the pure signalling equilibrium exists.
Part 1 of Proposition 6 establishes that if signalling is sufficiently expensive, there is an equilibrium
with no signalling, where all workers pool at e=0. If within this limiting case one takes the limit as
F becomes degenerate at 0 (meaning firms have no information), then this reduces to the pooling
allocation in Akerlof (1970). Conversely, part 2 establishes that if signalling is sufficiently cheap,
then the only equilibrium allocation is the benchmark least-cost separating allocation and firms’
expertise is not used.
5.6. Welfare
The only reason why allocations in the model are not first-best efficient is that signalling is
socially wasteful. This does not immediately imply that equilibria with less signalling are Pareto
superior: expected wages for different workers are different across equilibria so it is possible that
there could be winners and losers from shifting from one equilibrium to another. The following
result establishes that partial signalling equilibria can indeed be Pareto ranked against each other
(and against the pure signalling equilibrium), but cannot be Pareto ranked against a no-signalling
equilibrium if it exists:
Proposition 7 1. Suppose there is a partial signalling equilibrium with πP1 >0.
(a) It Pareto dominates the pure signalling equilibrium in the same economy.
(b) If there is another partial signalling equilibrium with πP1 >π
P
2 in the same economy, the first
equilibrium Pareto dominates the second.
2. Suppose there is a no-signalling equilibrium.
(a) It Pareto dominates the pure signalling equilibrium in the same economy.
(b) If there is also a partial signalling equilibrium with πP >0 in the same economy, neither
equilibrium Pareto dominates the other.
In comparing partial signalling equilibria, it is straightforward to show that firms are better off
in the higher-πP equilibrium, since wages are the same and there is a better pool of workers at
15. By contrast, in the degenerate case where F has full mass at some θ <λ, a no-signalling equilibrium never exists.
The right-hand side of (18) is zero at θ in this case, so there is always a profitable deviation. Intuitively, when all firms
are equally well informed, our model collapses to a standard signalling model and only the pure signalling equilibrium
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. High-type workers are indifferent because their payoff is wP. The critical step is to show





, which (other things being equal) increases their chances of earning wP but lose





their chance of being hired by any given firm. However, using the fact that in both equilibria high
types must be hired for sure it is possible to show that the first effect dominates, so low types also
prefer the higher-πP equilibrium.
A no-signalling equilibrium (if it exists) cannot be Pareto ranked against partial signalling
equilibria. Since the wage is higher and the cutoff firm is lower, workers are better off in the
no-signalling equilibrium. However, the best firms are worse off since they have to pay higher
wages and their accurate signals mean they benefit little from the improved pool of workers.




are better off in the no-signalling equilibrium while they
would make zero profits in the partial signalling equilibrium.
The model also makes it possible to ask, assuming there is a technology for firms to choose
θ at some cost, whether they have the right incentives to invest in acquiring expertise, such as
improving assessment models for job applicants, risk scoring models in insurance markets or
pricing models for stocks and financial derivatives. In Appendix B, following the approach in
Kurlat (2019), we show that in general the answer is ambiguous: firms may have incentives to
either over-invest or under-invest in expertise. We also provide a simple formula to quantify
the ratio of the social and private returns to expertise based on observable properties of the
equilibrium.
6. FALSE NEGATIVES
We now turn to the case with “false negative” mistakes, where F is continuous with support [λ,1].
Higher-i workers are relatively transparent, since most firms can tell (with certainty) that they
are high types, while lower-i high types are relatively obscure, since they can only be identified
as high types by the smarter, lower-θ firms. For expositional purposes, assume that the density
of firms f (θ) is strictly increasing, meaning that there is a higher density of less informed firms.
The general case, which requires working with an “ironed” density, is treated in Appendix D.
Unlike the false positives case, firms face a non-trivial decision as to what hiring rule to use.
There may be markets where a firm θ observes x(i,θ)=0 for all the workers that apply (so if it
insisted on hiring only workers with a positive signal it would not be able to hire at all) but it
knows that in equilibrium some high-type workers with i∈[λ,θ ) do apply, so it may want to hire
from the pool of all applicants. We refer to this as non-selective hiring.
6.1. Description.
In equilibrium, only the least transparent high-type workers signal. Letting uL denote the






while everyone else chooses e=0. Signalling markets with e=eS are straightforward: all the
applicants are high types, so less informed firms compete for them and hire them (non-selectively)
at a wage w=qH .
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Since f (θ) is assumed to be increasing, this means that for all i> iH there are more firms who can
detect high-type workers than there are workers. Hence, firms compete for them and hire them
(selectively) at wage w=qH .
Conversely, for i∈(iS,iH), there are more workers than firms who can identify them as high
types. Therefore, some of them have to be hired non-selectively, at wages sufficiently low to
attract non-selective firms. At each wage w∈(qL,qH) where there is active hiring, two types of
hiring take place: some workers are hired non-selectively, and in addition all the highest remaining
i-types are hired selectively and thus drop out of subsequent, lower-wage markets. Let w(0,i)
be the highest wage such that all worker types above i have already been hired. The pool of
applicants at w(0,i) consists of all the low types plus high types in the interval (iS,i] who have






Firms with θ = i hire f (i) workers selectively in this market since it involves the cheapest wage
at which they can identify high-type workers. Therefore, it must be that the remaining 1−f (i)
workers of type i were already hired non-selectively at wages above w(0,i). Since this is true for
any i, the probability density for any worker of being hired non-selectively in market (0,w(0,i))













This defines a cutoff worker i∗ who is indifferent between signalling (which gives a payoff



























is the lowest-wage market at which there is a chance of being hired non-
selectively. Low-type workers who have not found a job at or above this wage end up getting

















Replacing (20), (22), and (25) into (24) and simplifying gives the following indifference condition






















Equation (26) defines a positive relationship between i∗ (the worker who is indifferent between
signalling and not signalling) and iS (the cutoff for actually signalling). In general, i
∗ and iS are






































































































Copyedited by: ES MANUSCRIPT CATEGORY: Article
[19:28 2/11/2020 OP-REST200072.tex] RESTUD: The Review of Economic Studies Page: 28 1–50
28 REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
Figure 8
Signals, wages, and hiring decisions in an interior equilibrium.





who are indifferent between signalling and not
signalling but choose not to. It is straightforward to show that i∗ is increasing in iS . Workers
who signal do not apply for jobs in e=0 markets. Higher iS (more signalling) means the pool
of applicants for non-selective firms worsens, so in order to maintain zero-profits the wage must
fall (equation (22)). In turn, this means that the utility of both high- and low-type workers falls
(equations (23) and (25)). It falls more for high types because low types are hired with positive
probability in market (0,qL), where the wage is unaffected by higher iS . Hence, other things
































of firms who are capable of identifying i as being a high type is F (i), so we need f (i∗)(i−iS)≤F(i).












Equation (27) defines another positive relationship between iS and i
∗. If more of the obscure
workers decide to signal, then the most informed firms will work their way up to hire slightly less
obscure workers. Figure 8 summarizes the equilibrium signals, wages and hiring decisions.
6.2. Corner equilibrium.
Equations (26) and (27) hold for an interior equilibrium where some range of workers are indeed
hired by non-selective firms. However, it is possible that all workers below iH prefer to signal
rather than being hired at a wage low enough to attract non-selective firms, which would result
in a corner equilibrium with i∗ = iH . For this corner equilibrium, the market-clearing condition
(27) and definition (21) imply iS = iH −F (iH). Also, in this corner equilibrium, there is no non-
selective hiring, so uL =qL and eS =e
∗. This will be an equilibrium if workers just below iH
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which is equivalent to Ŵ(iH ,iH −F (iH))<0. The following proposition summarizes these results:
Proposition 8 Under false negatives, there exists a generically unique equilibrium:
1. All high types i∈[iH ,1] choose e=0 and are hired at w=qH .
2. For i∈[0,iH ), the equilibrium takes one of the following two possible forms:
(a) An interior equilibrium where iS and i
∗ solve (26) and (27) and:
i. A measure iS −λ of high types with i∈[λ,i
∗) choose e=eS , given by (20) and are hired at
w=qH .
ii. All other high types with i∈[λ,i∗) choose e=0 and are hired at w∈[w(0,i∗),w(0,iH )].
iii. All high types with i∈[i∗,iH ) choose e=0 and are hired at w∈[w(0,i),w(0,iH )].
iv. All low types i∈[0,λ) choose e=0 and are hired at w=qL or w∈[w(0,i
∗),w(0,iH )].
(b)A corner equilibrium where Ŵ(iH ,iH −F(iH ))<0 and:
i. A measure F(iH ) of high types with i∈[λ,iH ) choose e=0 and are hired at w=w
P.
ii. All other high types with i∈[λ,iH ) choose e=e
∗ and are hired at w=qH .
iii. All low types i∈[0,λ) choose e=0 and are hired at w=qL .
The proof is in Appendix D, which also describes all firms’ decisions. Moreover, we show that
the equilibrium behaves continuously in the symmetric information and expensive signalling
limits, and we deal with the general case in which the density of firm types f (θ ) is not necessarily
monotone.
6.3. Properties.
This model generates dispersion in expected wages among workers who are equally productive
and educated, depending on how transparent they are. In particular, the expected wages of high
types i∈[i∗,iH ), who all select e=0, are increasing in i.
17 Similarly, the model can explain, for
instance, different prices for asset-backed securities for which both the structure of tranches and
the underlying cash flows are similar, but which differ in how many buyers have access to accurate
pricing models to evaluate them. Interestingly, this dispersion is driven by break-even conditions
of firms that are not making use of expertise.
The structure of equilibrium is similar to the pattern of signalling and “countersignalling”
(Feltovich et al., 2002): it is the hard-to-identify high types who must use the costly signal in
order to differentiate themselves from low types. By contrast, the most obvious high types can be
confident that expert buyers are able to tell them apart, thus eliminating the need for signalling.
The setup in Feltovich et al. (2002) features three different levels of worker productivity; in our
two-type model, countersignalling instead emerges because high types differ in their transparency.
Moreover, our model generates the intuitive prediction that expected wages of those high types
who “countersignal” increase in their transparency.
17. In contrast, in the partial or no-signalling equilibria in the “false positives” case there is dispersion in expected
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We can also ask how the intensive and extensive margins of signalling, measured by eS and
iS −λ respectively, depend (locally) on parameters around an interior equilibrium. In Appendix A,
we show that an increase in the ratio cH/cL reduces signalling along both margins. For example,
an increase in dividend taxes leads to both a smaller fraction of firms paying dividends and a
lower dividends per dividend-paying firm. We also show that an increase in demand leads to
polarization in signalling: fewer workers choose positive education but those who do choose a
higher quantity.
7. CONCLUSION
We have developed a general theory to analyse competitive equilibria in economies where buyers
possess heterogeneous information about sellers and contracts are multidimensional, specifying
both a price and a signal. These information and contracting patterns are the feature of many
markets, including labour, asset, and insurance markets, as we have illustrated through a series
of examples. Our notion of equilibrium implies that an equilibrium always exists, it may not
be unique in the false-positives case but is generically unique in the false-negatives case, and it
may not be efficient. Moreover, we uncover a tractable structure to characterize it in both cases,
based on the intersection of an indifference and a market-clearing condition. This allows us to
provide results on comparative statics. Our model predicts intuitive and continuous equilibrium
responses to, for instance, changes in the prior, demand, signalling costs or expertise that cannot
be generated in the canonical model with uninformed buyers.
We expect that our framework can be extended to study other structures of buyers’ direct
information, including ones where firms cannot be perfectly ranked by their expertise, such as
when both false positive and negative errors occur. In this case, we conjecture the equilibrium to
feature a combination of the two pure cases we have analysed: high types are hired in a similar
way as in the false-negatives case, except that those in [iS,iH ) are partly hired by selective false-
positive firms, because those firms have an advantage over non-selective firms by being able to
screen out some low types.
Our model may also be a useful starting point to study a number of richer environments. First,
a market for information may arise, where better informed firms sell their information to less
informed ones (e.g. in the form of analyst reports), instead of just trading on it themselves. To
prevent the price of information from dropping to zero, some form of capacity constraints would
again be required, which would effectively change the distribution of expertise in our model.
Second, many of our applications have a dynamic aspect, where the costly signal involves a delay
in trading. Our approach could be used to consider settings where some direct information is
revealed to buyers gradually at heterogeneous rates, and one could explore how this affects the
timing pattern of trades. These issues are left for future research.
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We compute how the amount of signalling 1−πP in a partial signalling equilibrium depends on parameters. We focus
on cases where the locus of the market-clearing condition (16) is steeper than of the indifference condition (15), which
corresponds to a heuristic notion of stability of the equilibrium.
Proposition A.1 1. Signalling decreases with the cost ratio cH/cL .
2. Signalling decreases with a FOSD increase in the expertise distribution F or an increase in the demand for workers .
3. Signalling does not change with productivities qH and qL .
The logic of part A.1 is as follows. The ratio cH/cL governs how much utility high types obtain if they separate by
choosing e∗. Since wP is the wage that makes them indifferent, higher cH/cL means a lower wage. This attracts lower-θ
firms, so more high types can forgo signalling and still find a job. As for part A.1, a FOSD increase in the distribution
of θ means that firms are able to screen out more low types, and therefore hire more high types (and an increase in 
has the same effect). Therefore, more high types are able to forgo education and still find a job. Finally, productivities
have no effect on equilibrium signalling. The wage wP is a weighted average of qH and qL . Therefore, no matter what
these productivities are, the indifferent firm θP will be the one whose pool of acceptable workers includes a proportion of
exactly cH/cL low types. If, say, the productivity of low types was lower, the wage w adjusts exactly so as to leave firm
θP indifferent and the fraction of high types who signal unchanged.
Proof. Using the reparametrization of the model where each firm demands  workers rather than just one, it is


























represent the solutions to (A.3) and (A.2), respectively, where p is a parameter. The








=0. Using the implicit function



















1. Equation (A.3) implies that θ I is decreasing in cH/cL , whereas cH/cL does not appear in equation (A.2). Using
this in equation (A.4) gives the result.
2. The distribution F does not appear in equation (A.3). The term inside the integral in equation (A.2) is an increasing
function of θ . Therefore, a FOSD increase in F implies that the left-hand side of (A.2) increases, so θP must
rise to maintain equality. Using this in equation (A.4) gives the first part of the result. (A.2) implies that θM is
increasing in , and  does not appear in equation (A.3). Using this in equation (A.4) gives the second part of
the result.
3. This follows because neither qH nor qL appear in equation (A.4).

A.2. False negatives
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Proposition A.2 1. Both the intensive and extensive margins of signalling decrease with the cost ratio cH/cL .
2. The intensive margin of signalling increases but the extensive margin decreases with the demand for workers .
3. The extensive margin of signalling is invariant with respect to productivities qH and qL ; the intensive margin eS
increases with qH −qL .
Higher cH/cL makes separation more costly, so fewer high types signal. This improves the pool of workers in no-signalling
markets, so non-selective firms pay higher wages. This raises the utility of low types, so less intense signalling is required
to separate from them. An increase in demand means that at every level of expertise there are more selective hires, and
therefore fewer non-selective hires, so it is harder for low types and obscure high types to get hired non-selectively. This
makes low types worse off; therefore a more intense signal is needed to successfully separate, so fewer high types do
so. As in the false-positives case, qH and qL drop out of equations (26) and (27), so the extensive margin is unchanged.
However, a greater gap between qH and qL makes it more attractive for low types to mimic high types, so separation
requires a more intense signal.
Proof. Let i∗I (iS,p) and i
∗M (iS,p) represent the solutions to (26) and (27) respectively, where p is a vector of parameters.
The equilibrium value of iS is given by a solution to the equation i
∗I (iS,p)−i
∗M (iS,p)=0. Using the implicit function


























The denominator of (A.5) is negative, and equation (26) implies that ∂i
∗I
∂iS

























































































2. Introducing variable demand  leaves equations (26) and (27) unchanged except that equation (21) generalizes
























iH − iS +λ




























Now assume towards a contradiction that eS falls. This implies that the utility of the marginal high type i
∗, given
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(using (A.8) to replace
∂iH
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which contradicts the first part of the result.
3. The fact that i∗ and iS do not depend on qH and qL follows because neither qH nor qL appear in equations (26)










which is increasing in qH −qL .

B. EXPERTISE ACQUISITION
Following the approach in Kurlat (2019), we ask whether firms have the correct incentives to acquire expertise. Consider
an individual firm j and suppose it could invest in becoming better at screening workers. This will affect its profits and
also, by affecting the equilibrium, the economy’s total deadweight cost of education. Denote by θj the level of expertise














denote the individual firm’s profits, where we have made explicit that these depend on the firm’s choice θj and the


















W depends on θj because firm j’s choice of expertise affects equilibrium allocations.













is concave in θj . The function cj (·) can be different for different firms, leading to different
equilibrium expertise choices. Taking the equilibrium as given, firm j will invest until the marginal cost of better screening








/∂θj . A social planner interested in minimizing deadweight costs would





























>1, the marginal social value of better screening is greater than the marginal cost, which would provide a rationale




<1, there would be a case for taxing those investments.
The following proposition provides a formula for r(θj) that relates it to equilibrium objects which, in principle, could
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2. The elasticity η is greater than 1.




does not depend on θj . One might have conjectured that
the misalignment of incentives would be different for firms that, e.g. due to different cost functions cj (·), choose different
θ in equilibrium. Yet, it turns out that, if the market under- or over-provides incentives to improve direct screening, it
does so uniformly for all firms.
Second, Proposition B.1 shows that r can be written as the product of the signalling cost ratio and the demand elasticity
of πP . The ratio cH/cL enters the formula because, by equation (B.2), it governs the deadweight cost of signalling for a
high type that chooses e∗.





crucially depends on how the equilibrium πP changes in response to an individual firm’s screening technology θj . If
a firm improves its screening technology, it will reject more low type applicants and therefore hire more high types,
so the market-clearing condition shifts outwards. Recall from Section 5.5 that demand affects the equilibrium through
exactly the same channel: by producing an outward shift in the market-clearing condition. Hence, η precisely summarizes
the effect of a firm’s expertise on πP . In particular, we show in the proof of Proposition B.1 that the overall effect on
πP depends on the size of the shift to the market-clearing condition and on the difference between the slopes of the
indifference and market-clearing conditions. For example, when these slopes are very similar, πP will respond strongly
to a firm’s expertise and η will be large.
Overall, the result implies that it is desirable to encourage investments in direct screening if the cost of signalling
is relatively similar for high and low types (which makes the deadweight cost of signalling high) and if the signalling
decisions of high types are highly sensitive to demand (which would make them highly sensitive to improved screening
as well). For example, higher dividend taxes make the signalling costs of different types more similar, thereby making
an underinvestment in expertise more likely. Moreover, the cost ratio and the demand elasticity of πP are sufficient to
determine the magnitude of r. Conditional on these two statistics, knowledge of other parameters, such as the shape of the
cost function c(·), are not required. As usual with sufficient statistics though, η is of course endogenous to the equilibrium.
The second part of Proposition B.1 establishes a lower bound of 1 on the elasticity η, which in turn implies a lower
bound of cH/cL on r. To understand this, suppose there is an increase in demand of %. If the mix of workers in market




would hire % more high types, implying an elasticity of 1. However,
precisely because πP increases, the mix of workers available in market (0,wP) improves, so each firm increases its hiring
of high types by more than %. Furthermore, higher πP means that marginal firms enter market (0,wP), further increasing




of firms near the cutoff θP . Since this density could
be very high (to the point where the slopes of the indifference and market-clearing conditions are the same, leading to an
unbounded response of πP to ), there is no upper bound on r.
The magnitude of r depends on the relative importance of the various externalities from a firm choosing its screening
technology. First, in an interior partial signalling equilibrium, improved screening always helps other firms, since it
leads more high types to forgo education and improves the mix of workers available at (0,wP). Second, it is neutral for
high-type workers since they get a payoff of wP regardless. Third, the effect on low types with i>θ is also positive. In
principle, there are offsetting effects: these workers benefit from having more firms hiring in market (0,wP) and lose from
having more high type workers looking for work in (0,wP). However, just like when one compares across equilibria, the
market-clearing condition implies that the first effect dominates. Lastly, for low types with i<θ the effect is ambiguous,
because better screening increases their chances of being rejected. If this last effect is negative and strong enough, the
sum of the externalities could be negative, which would lead to r <1.
If instead of being in a partial signalling equilibrium the economy is at a no-signalling equilibrium, it is immediate
that improved screening has no marginal social value, since no worker is signalling. It would still have a positive marginal
private value, so r =0. In this region, better screening by one firm has a negative effect on other firms, since it does not
improve the pool of workers in market (0,wN ) but drives up the wage wN .
Proof.
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Replacing (B.9) into equation (B.8) and simplifying gives the result.







































Replacing in equation (B.10) gives the result.

C. OMITTED PROOFS
Proof of Proposition 1
1. The proposed {ei,(eθ ,wθ ,χθ ),µ,G} is an equilibrium.




and high types are indifferent between
any e≥e∗, so education decisions (7) solve the workers’ problem. (10) implies that firms can make zero profits
by hiring in market (0,qL) (where there are only low types) or (e
∗,qH ) (where there are only high types), and any




=0 or results in losses. Therefore (8), which places demand only in markets
(0,qL) and (e
∗,qH ) and yields zero profits, is an optimal choice. Furthermore, (8) implies that no firm hires more









Equations (7), (9), (10), and (C.1) imply that Condition 1 holds. Condition 2 is trivially satisfied because (9) is





optimal and high types find e≥e∗ optimal, (9) implies that beliefs satisfy Condition 4 when
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2. The above equilibrium is unique.
a. In any equilibrium, each firm makes zero profits. If there was a firm that made strictly negative profits, it
could increase profits by setting χ (i)=0 for all i. On the other hand, suppose there is a firm that makes
strictly positive profits in some market (e,w). Recall that F(1)>1, so there must exist a strictly positive
measure of firms that do not hire. Any such firm could increase its profits by directing its search to market
(e,w), so it cannot be optimizing.
b. In any equilibrium, there does not exist a market (e,w) such that I(ei =e)µ(w;e,i)>0 both for some i<λ
























−w̄(e,i)≥cLǫ. Since firms cannot discriminate, it follows that w̄(e,i) is the























>cHǫ. This contradicts the premise that type i
′ finds e optimal. Hence,








only includes i≥λ, then



















+cHǫ, which contradicts the premise that type i
′ finds e optimal.
c. In any equilibrium, all low types obtain a payoff of qL . Suppose that they obtain a payoff q
′
L >qL . This
implies that they are hired with positive probability in a market with w>qL . By part (C), the supply in this
market only includes low types, which implies negative profits for firms, contradicting part (C). Suppose









then firms can make profits by hiring in this market; otherwise, µ(w;e,i)=0, which means low-type
workers can obtain a payoff w>q′L by choosing e=0.
d. In any equilibrium, all high types obtain payoff qH −cH e
∗. Suppose first that they obtain a payoff uH >
qH −cH e





′ >qH −cH e










is the same for all i, this implies that low types can obtain a
payoff higher than qL , contradicting part (C). If instead e
′ ≥e∗, this implies they are hired with positive
probability at a wage w>qH and hence strictly negative profits for firms, contradicting part (C). Second,
suppose they obtain a payoff uH <qH −cH e
∗. This means that for any i≥λ it must be that w̄(e∗,i)<qH ,
and therefore w̄(e∗,i)<qH for i<λ as well. Consider a market with e=e







>0 because otherwise µ(w;e∗,i)=0 by Condition 5, so high types can obtain a payoff of
at least w−cH e
∗ >uH by choosing education e
∗. But the support of G(·;e∗,w,χ) cannot include low types
because choosing e∗ implies a payoff of w̄(e∗,i)−cLe
∗ <qH −cLe
∗ <qL , contradicting part (C); and the
support of G(·;e∗,w,χ) cannot include only high types because then firms could make profits by hiring
in market (e∗,w), contradicting part (C).
e. Step (C) implies that all low types select e=0 and get hired for sure in market (0,qL). Step (C) implies
that all high types must select e=e∗ and get hired for sure in market (e∗,qH ). This determines (7) as well
as (9) and (10) in these markets. It also requires that there is total demand λ in market (0,qL) and demand
1−λ in (e∗,qH ), thus (8) must hold. For all other markets, (9) and (10) then follow from Conditions 1 to 5.
Proof of Proposition 3
We first show that, in any equilibrium, all low types choose e=0 and get hired at least at wage w=qL . Some fraction
π ∈[0,1] of the high types choose e=0 and find a job for sure at wage w=wP (if π <1) or w≥wP (if π =1). The rest
of the high types choose e=e∗ and get hired with certainty at wage w=qH . We prove this claim based on the following
sequence of steps:
1. By the same argument as in the proof of Proposition 1, all firms make non-negative profits.
2. Firms’ profits must be weakly increasing in θ . To see this, suppose that θ ′ >θ but firm θ makes strictly higher
profits than θ ′, and consider the market and hiring rule (eθ ,wθ ,χθ ) chosen by firm θ . By hiring in market (eθ ,wθ )
and setting χθ ′ (i)=I(i≥θ
′), firm θ ′ could make profits at least as high as firm θ since it accepts all the high types
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3. There exists some θ̄ such that all firms θ ≤ θ̄ make zero profits, and F(θ̄ )>0. To see this, recall that at least a
measure F(1)−1>0 of firms do not hire, which implies zero profits. The claim then follows from the monotonicity
of profits in θ .
4. In any equilibrium, low types obtain a payoff of at least qL . Suppose that they obtain a payoff q
′
L <qL and consider








>0, then firms θ <θ̄ can make profits by hiring in this
market; otherwise, µ(w;0,i)=0 by Condition 1, which means low-type workers can obtain a payoff w>q′L by
choosing e=0.
5. In any equilibrium, high types obtain a payoff of at least wP =qH −cH e
∗. Suppose they obtain a payoff uH <
qH −cH e
∗. This means that for any i≥λ it must be that w̄(e∗,i)<qH , and therefore w̄(e
∗,i)<qH for i<λ as






>0 for all θ because otherwise
µ(w;e∗,λ)=0 by Condition 5, so high types can obtain a payoff of at least w−cH e
∗ >uH by choosing education
e∗. But the support of G(·;e∗,w,χθ ) cannot include low types for any θ because choosing e
∗ implies a payoff
of w̄(e∗,i)−cLe
∗ <qH −cLe
∗ =qL ; and the support of G(·;e
∗,w,χθ ) cannot include only high types for θ <θ̄
because then firms θ <θ̄ could make profits by hiring in market (e∗,w).
6. For any i≥λ and any e, µ(·;e,i) has a point mass at a single wage. To see this, consider two wage levels w′ >w
and suppose that high types are hired with positive probability in both of them if they choose e. Let θ ′ be the
highest-type firm that hires at wage w′. Conditions 1 and 3 imply that the expected productivity of workers that




and (e,w) is the same, and therefore, it cannot be optimal for firm θ ′ to hire at
wage w′. Therefore it must be that all high types are hired at the same wage, which implies that µ(·;e,i) is a step
function for every i.
7. In any equilibrium, all low types get education e=0. To see this, assume to the contrary that some i<λ chooses
e= ẽ>0. By step (C), we have that w̄(ẽ,i)≥qL +cL ẽ>qL . Together with step (C), this implies that in every
market (w,ẽ) with w>qL where type i has some chance of being hired, there are also high-type applicants,
because otherwise firms would make losses by paying more than qL . Step (C) implies that there can be only
one such market; label it (ẽ,w̃). Letting uH be the utility obtained by high types in equilibrium, this implies
w̃=uH +cH ẽ. Let θ be the lowest firm type that hires in market (ẽ,w̃) and πH be the measure of high types that
choose e= ẽ. Using the fact that all high types that choose e= ẽ are hired in market (ẽ,w̃), the probability that





dF(θ ). Since not being hired in market (ẽ,w̃) implies







which is lower than qL for i sufficiently close to θ . Let i be the lowest worker type such that there is a δ1 >0 such




choose e= ẽ. We know that i>θ .









prefer (e′′,w′′) over (ẽ,w̃), since they hire from the same pool of workers as firm θ̃ in market (ẽ,w̃) but from a
more selected pool in other markets. But then the fact that worker i= θ̃ does not choose ẽ implies that worker i
does not want to choose ẽ either, since he obtains the same payoff as worker i= θ̃ upon choosing ẽ but weakly
higher in every other market. This contradicts the assumption that worker i chooses ẽ. Therefore, it must be that




hire in market (ẽ,w̃).
Since there are no workers with i< i in market (ẽ,w̃), then upon hiring in market (ẽ,w̃), any firm θ ≤ i hires from
the entire pool of applicants, without rejecting any. Since this hiring rule is available to all firms, part (C) implies
that all θ ≤ i firms must make zero profits by hiring in market (ẽ,w̃). For this to be true, it must mean that they
cannot make profits in any other market, including any markets with e=0. But any firm with θ > i will be able to




, which implies it can make strictly positive profits by hiring in market
(ẽ,w̃). Therefore, all firms in the interval (i,i+δ1] hire in market (ẽ,w̃). This in turn implies that if worker i is
willing to choose ẽ, then worker i+δ1 strictly prefers ẽ, since, compared to worker i, he has a higher chance of
being hired in market (ẽ,w̃) and the same chance of being hired in any other market. By continuity, this implies




choose e= ẽ. Repeating the same reasoning, this










Let θ̂ be the highest firm type that hires in market (ẽ,w̃).






>0, then they can only include high
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0, this requires µ(uH +ǫ;0,i)=0 for all i≥λ, which implies that e=0 is a better choice than ẽ for high
types, again a contradiction.










for sure as well, and therefore obtain utility uH −(cL −cH )ẽ. Now consider a market with e
′ = ẽ+ǫ and



























































only includes i≥λ, then for small enough ǫ, firm θ










=0, which in turn implies that high types prefer e′ to
ẽ, a contradiction.
8. In any equilibrium, the high types select either e=0 or e=e∗. If some types selected e>e∗, then by step (C) this
would require paying them w>qH and therefore involve negative profits for firms. On the other hand, suppose




=0. For any w≥w, beliefs can
only place weight on high types since by part (C), no low types choose e′. This implies that if w<qH , any firm,




, which contradicts part (C). Therefore
we must have w=qH . Note that this implies that there can only be a single e
′ ∈ (0,e∗] such that ei =e
′ for some
i≥λ since otherwise the high types would only select the lowest such e. Let π be the fraction of high types who
choose e=0 and 1−π the fraction who choose e=e′. Since they must be indifferent, it follows that high types
who choose e=0 get a wage of w′ =qH −cH e










This defines the cutoff firm θ ′ such that firms with θ <θ ′ make zero profits. Furthermore, this implies that all









of firms who hire workers in market (e′,qH ). Since all high types who choose e
′ get a job at w=qH it follows that




























will be arbitrarily close to 0, and therefore






′ >qL . Thus, there is a low type who would prefer e=e
′ to e=0, which
contradicts step (C).
To complete the proof, let uH be the equilibrium payoff of high types.
1. If uH >w
P , then it must be that all high types choose e=0 and get hired at a wage w=uH . Firms will find it




This defines a cutoff θ̄ , so (12) holds. Furthermore, since all high types must be hired at this wage, (11) must hold.
2. If uH =w
P , then high types are indifferent between choosing e=0 and getting hired at wage wP and choosing









This defines the cutoff θ̄ , so (15) holds. Furthermore, since all high types who choose e=0 must be hired at w,
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Proof of Proposition 4
Partial signalling equilibrium.
1. Necessity of condition (19).
Let w̃(e,i) be the wage that would make worker i indifferent between their equilibrium payoff and choosing




u(i)+cH e if i≥λ,
(C.2)
where u(i) is given by (17). Suppose firm θ considers hiring in market (e,w). For it to believe that it will find
χθ -acceptable low types, i.e. workers with i∈[θ,λ), it must be that:
w̃(e,θ)≤ w̃(e,i)= w̄(e,i)≤ w̄(e,λ)≤ w̃(e,λ). (C.3)
The first inequality follows from the fact that u(i) and therefore w̃(e,i) is increasing in i. The second step follows
from Condition 4: if beliefs place weight on type i, then i must be indifferent between e and his equilibrium choice.
The third follows from Condition 2, which implies that w̄ is monotonic in i. The last inequality follows from the
fact that otherwise worker λ could exceed his equilibrium payoff by choosing e. By Condition 4, the only markets
where firm θ can place beliefs on χθ -acceptable low types are those with education levels that worker i=θ is
willing to choose for weakly lower wages than high types.
Moreover, for firm θ not to have well-defined beliefs about market (e,w) it must be that:
w≤ w̃(e,θ), (C.4)
since otherwise Condition 5 requires µ(w;e,θ)=0, so some χθ -acceptable worker could exceed his equilibrium
payoff by choosing e.
Together, conditions (C.3) and (C.4) imply that for any market (e,w) such that w̃(e,λ)< w̃(e,θ) and w> w̃(e,λ),
firm θ ’s beliefs G(·;e,w,χθ ) can only place weight on high types.
Denote by (eDθ ,w
D
























By (B.1), profits in market (eDθ ,w
D
θ ) exceed those that firm θ obtains in equilibrium if condition (19) is violated,
which implies it cannot be an equilibrium.
















(0,wP,χ (i)=I(i≥θ )) for θ ≥θP
(0,qL,χ (i)=1∀i) for a measure λ−ϕ
P of firms θ <θP



























dF (θ) if e=0,wP >w≥qL
I(w≥min{w̃(e,i),w̃(e,λ)}) otherwise
(C.7)
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if e≥eDθ ,w≥ w̃(e,λ)
0 for any other (e,w)
(C.8)



































0 for any other (e,w)
(C.9)
We now verify that {ei,(eθ ,wθ ,χθ ),µ,G} satisfies all the equilibrium conditions from Definition 1. (C.7) implies




and high types are indifferent between any e≥0, so
the education decisions (C.5) solve the workers’ problem. The beliefs (C.8) and (C.9) together with the fact that
condition (19) holds implies that firms θ ≥θP maximize profits by hiring selectively in market (0,wP). All other
firms make zero profits by hiring non-selectively either in market (0,qL) or (e





=0 or results in losses. Therefore the demands (C.6) are an optimal choice. Furthermore,

































Together with (C.8) and (C.9), this implies that Condition 1 holds. Condition 2 is satisfied because, by (C.7),
µ(·;e,i) is weakly decreasing in i. Finally, (C.5) and (C.7) imply that beliefs (C.8) and (C.9) satisfy Condition 3




optimal and high types find any e≥0 optimal, beliefs
satisfy Condition 4 when they are well defined, and G(Iχ ;e,w,χ )=0 only at wages where µ(w;e,i)=0 for all i
such that χ (i)=1, so Condition 5 is satisfied as well.
Pure signalling equilibrium. The above analysis applies for the special case with πP =0.
No-signalling equilibrium. Necessity and sufficiency of condition (18) are proved by the same steps as for








(0,wN ,χ (i)=I(i≥θ )) for θ ≥θN
(0,qL,χ (i)=1∀i) for a measure 1−F(λ)+F(θ














dF (θ) if e=0,wN >w≥qL
I(w≥min{w̃(e,i),w̃(e,λ)}) otherwise
(C.12)





























if e≥eDθ ,w≥ w̃(e,λ)
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if e≥eN ,w≥ w̃(e,λ)
0 for any other (e,w)
(C.14)
with eN = (wN −qL)/(cL −cH )
Proof of Proposition 5



























































which cannot hold for sufficiently low λ̂, so the candidate equilibrium is indeed an equilibrium. Furthermore,
taking the limit in (C.15) we obtain lim
λ̂→0 w
N =qH .
2. Equation (11) implies that limF→F∗ θ
N =λ, which implies, using (12), that limF→F∗ w
N =qH for F sufficiently
close to F∗, so a candidate equilibrium with the desired properties exists. Furthermore, as θN →λ, condition (18)
cannot hold so the candidate equilibrium is indeed an equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 6











and therefore lim cH
cL
→1 w
P =qL . Using (12) we have w
N >wP , so there is a candidate corner equilibrium.
Furthermore, as cH/cL →1, condition (18) holds so the candidate equilibrium is indeed an equilibrium.
2. Taking the limit, lim cH
cL
→0 w
P =qH . Using (15), this implies θ
P →λ, so condition (16) cannot hold for any πP >0.
Proof of Proposition 7
1. It is sufficient to prove claim (b) because claim (a) is a special case with πP2 =θ
P
2 =0. By equation (B.1), firm
profits are increasing in πP , and since wP is the same across equilibria, firms are better off in the higher-πP
equilibrium. High-type workers obtain a payoff of wP in both equilibria, so they are indifferent. Using (17),
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2. (a) In the first equilibrium, all firms make zero profits, so they are better off in the second equilibrium.
Low-type workers get a payoff of qL in the first equilibrium, but those with i>θ
N get more in the second
equilibrium. High-type workers get a payoff of wP in the first equilibrium but wN in the second, so they
are also better off.
(b) By equation (B.1), for θ sufficiently close to λ, firm θ ’s profits approach qH −w, so w
P <wN implies they
are higher in the first equilibrium. High-type workers get a payoff of wP in the first equilibrium but wN
in the second, so they are better off in the second.
D. FALSE NEGATIVES
Uniqueness in case f (θ) is strictly increasing
Proposition D.1 If condition (28) holds, the system of equations (26), (27) has no solution. Otherwise, it has a unique
solution.





















































































































































































































Therefore, if (28) holds, there can be no i∗ ∈ [λ,iH ] that satisfies (i
∗)=0 because (λ)<0 and (iH )<0 and  must
be increasing at any solution. Instead, if condition (28) does not hold, (iH )≥0, so by continuity and using the fact that
 is increasing at any solution, there is exactly one i∗ ∈ [λ,iH ] that satisfies (i
∗)=0. 
Continuity in the limit
Proposition D.2 1. lim
λ̂→0 w(0,i)=qH , limλ̂→0 i
∗ =λ, and lim
λ̂→0 iS =λ, for all i∈[i
∗,iH ).
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Proof.


















































∗ − iS)+ λ̂
=0 (D.3)
while the market-clearing condition is unchanged. The first statement follows directly from equation (D.2), the
second from equation (D.3) and the last from equation (D.7).
2. Since the measure of firms is assumed to be greater than 1, for F sufficiently close to F∗, then f (i)>1 for all i,
which implies iH =λ.
3. Equation (26) implies lim cH
cL
→1 i











By part 1, as the fraction of low types goes to zero, nobody signals and everyone is paid qH . Part 2 says that as firms
become fully informed, again nobody signals and all high types are paid qH . Finally, part 3 shows that if signalling is
sufficiently expensive, no workers signal in equilibrium. In all cases the equilibrium allocations are continuous in the
limit.
General case
For the case where f (i) is not monotone, the argument in Section 6 needs to be modified. Consider two workers, i and i′






















, which is less than the f (i) workers that firms with θ = i want to hire.
Realizing this, firms would bid up the wage, displacing non-selective firms. To characterize exactly what will happen, it
is useful to define F̄(θ ) as the convex hull of F(θ ), i.e. the highest convex function on [λ,1] such that F̄(θ )≤F(θ ):
F̄(θ ) ≡ min
ω,θ1,θ2
{ωF(θ1)+(1−ω)F(θ2)}
s.t. ω∈[0,1], θ1,θ2 ∈[λ,1]and ωθ1 +(1−ω)θ2 =θ.
The corresponding density f̄ (θ ), which is weakly increasing, is the “ironed” version of the original density f (θ ). We now




i : f̄ (i)≥1
}
.
This generalizes the definition of iH in (21), allowing both for the possibility of ironing and the case where f (i)>1 for
all i (in which case trivially iH =λ). Let the reservation wage for type i∈[i









= f̄ (i). (D.4)
Hence, when f̄ is strictly increasing, this coincides with (22), but in a flat region (due to ironing), w(0,i) equals the value
for the top of the ironing range. In other words, in intervals [i0,i1] where the ironed density f̄ is constant, there will be
“bunching:” all remaining workers who are not hired non-selectively at higher wages are hired at the same wage w̄(0,i1)





















i′ : f̄ (i′)= f̄ (i)
}
















Equation (D.6) generalizes the indifference condition (26) to account for the fact that, with bunching, the reservation
wage function (D.4) and hence Ŵ(i,iS) can be discontinuous in i. Note that, by (D.6), whenever i
∗ falls into a bunching
region, it corresponds to the lower end of it.
These definitions allow us to state the following general existence and uniqueness result, of which Proposition 8 in
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Proposition D.3 There exists a generically unique equilibrium:
1. All low types i∈[0,λ) choose e=0.
2. All high types i∈[iH ,1] choose e=0.
3. For i∈[λ,iH ), the equilibrium takes one of the following two possible forms:
(a) An interior equilibrium where iS and i
∗ solve (D.6) and (D.7) and:
(i) A measure iS −λ of high types with i∈[λ,i
∗) choose e=eS .
(ii) All other high types with i∈[λ,i∗) choose e=0.
(b) A corner equilibrium where Ŵ(iH ,iH −F(iH ))<0 and:
(i) A measure F(iH ) of high types with i∈[λ,iH ) choose e=0.
(ii) All other high types with i∈[λ,iH ) choose e=e
∗.
The corner equilibrium is of the same form as described in Section 6. If the equilibrium is interior, the proposition
encompasses two cases. Either there is no bunching at i∗, in which case our previous analysis goes through: the indifference
condition Ŵ(i∗,iS)=0 implies that type i
∗ is just indifferent between signalling or not, and all high types below i∗ who
do not signal are hired at least at wage wS =w(0,i
∗). The other case allows for i∗ to be in a bunching region. Because
there is a discontinuity in u(i) at i∗ in this case, i∗ is given by the smallest i that still prefers choosing e=0 over signalling
(so u(i∗)>qH −cH eS and hence Ŵ(i
∗,iS)>0). All high types i< i
∗ are indifferent between signalling or not. The wages
at which workers are hired and all firms’ decisions are specified in the proof below.
When there is bunching at the bottom (i.e. on the interval [λ,i∗]), the market-clearing condition (D.7) implies iS =λ,
so there is no signalling whatsoever in equilibrium. This occurs when there is a high density of precisely informed buyers
relative to less informed ones.
We now provide a proof of Proposition D.3, establishing first the uniqueness and then the existence of the stated
equilibrium.
Uniqueness We prove uniqueness based on the following sequence of steps:
1. By the same arguments as in the proof of Proposition 3:
(a) all firms make non-negative profits
(b) profits are decreasing in θ
(c) all firms θ ≥ θ̄ make zero profits in equilibrium, with θ̄ ∈[λ,1) and F(1)−F(θ̄ )>0
(d) low types obtain a payoff of at least qL
(e) high types obtain a payoff of at least wP =qH −cH e
∗.
2. Because all low types are indistinguishable for all firms, all low types must obtain the same utility. Denote this
by uL .
3. Utility for workers is weakly increasing in i. This follows immediately from Condition 2.






′ for all i<λ. Consider all markets with e=e′ and w>qL where low types are hired with
positive probability. For low types to be hired, in any such market there must be firms that hire non-selectively,
setting χ (i)=1 for all i. By step (D), there must be high-type applicants in all these markets.
Let w′ be the highest wage where anyone choosing e′ is hired with positive probability. Suppose first that some
high types i′ ≥λ are hired in market (e′,w′) by selective firms θ ≤ i′ setting selection rule χθ (i)=I(i≥θ ). The
equilibrium payoff of these high types must be u′H ≤w
′ −cH e
′. Consider a market (0,w̃) with w̃∈ (w′ −cH e
′,w′).
Then G(Iχθ ;0,w̃,χθ )>0 since otherwise µ(w̃;0,i
′)=0 by Condition 5, so type i′ could obtain a payoff of at
least w̃>u′H by choosing e=0. The support of G(·;0,w̃,χθ ) can only include high types by construction of χθ .
But this would imply that firm θ could increase its profits by hiring high types in market (0,w̃) instead of market
(e′,w′) at wage w̃<w′. Hence, everyone in market (e′,w′) must be hired by non-selective firms. Since this is
feasible for any firm and by step (D), all firms must make zero profits in market (e′,w′). This implies w′ <qH .
Because all firms hire non-selectively in market (e′,w′), µ(w′;e′,i)=µ′ is the same for all i. Suppose first that
µ′ >0. Consider a market (e′,w′ −ǫ). Then for sufficiently small ǫ>0, the applicant pool is the same in markets
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market (e′,w′ −ǫ), contradicting step (D). Hence we must have µ′ =0. This implies that the equilibrium payoff
of the low types is u′L =w
′ −cLe
′ and the equilibrium payoff of those high types who choose e′ is u′H =w
′ −cH e
′.
Consider a market (e′′,w′′) such that e′′ =e′ +ǫ and w′′ ∈ (w′ +cHǫ,w
′ +cLǫ). Suppose χ (i)=1 for all i. Then
G(Iχ ;e
′′,w′′,χ )>0 since otherwise µ(w′′;e′′,i)=0 for all i, so all high types who choose e′ could obtain payoff
w′′ −cH e
′′ >w′ −cH e
′ =u′H , a contradiction. The support of G(·;e
′′,w′′,χ ) cannot include low types since w′′ −
cLe
′′ <w′ −cLe
′ =u′L . The support of G(·;e
′′,w′′,χ ) cannot include only high types since then any firm θ >θ̄ could
make strictly positive profits in market (e′′,w′′) for ǫ∈ (0,(qH −w
′)/cL). This delivers the final contradiction.
5. Any high type who chooses e>0 is hired with probability 1 at w=qH . Suppose otherwise, then there exists
a market (e,w) with w<qH such that there are high-type applicants. Since there are no low types in market
(e,w) by step (D), any firm θ >θ̄ could then make positive profits by hiring non-selectively in market (e,w),
contradicting step (D).
6. No firm hires high types selectively at any e>0. Suppose there was a high type i>λ who is hired in market (e,qH )
with e>0 by a firm θ < i that sets selection rule χθ (i)=I(i≥θ ). Consider market (0,w
′) with w′ ∈ (qH −cH e,qH ).
Then G(Iχθ ;e,qH ,χθ )>0 since otherwise µ(qH ,0,i)=0 by Condition 5, so type i could obtain a payoff w
′ >
qH −cH e by choosing e=0. Since by construction the support of G(·;e,qH ,χθ ) only includes high types and since
w′ <qH , firm θ can increase its profits by hiring high types in market (0,w
′) rather than (e,qH ), a contradiction.
Hence, all high types selecting e>0 are hired by firms using selection rule χ (i)=1 for all i.
7. If any high types choose some education eS >0, it must satisfy qH −cLeS =uL . Suppose first that some high types
choose e∈ (0,eS). By step (D), they are hired at wage qH and by step (D) they are hired by non-selective firms.
However, this implies that the low types, by choosing e, could obtain qH −cLe>uL , a contradiction. Suppose next
that some high types choose e>eS . Consider some market (eS,qH −ǫ) and selection rule χ (i)=1 for all i, which
is feasible for all firms. For sufficiently small ǫ, G(Iχ ;eS,qH −ǫ,χ )>0 since otherwise µ(qH −ǫ;eS,i)=0 and
those high types choosing e could do better by choosing education eS . By Condition 4, the support cannot include
low types because qH −cLe<uL . Hence, firms θ ≥ θ̄ could make strictly positive profits in market (eS,qH −ǫ),
contradicting step (D).
8. Define










There exists a cutoff i∗ such that: for i< i∗, high types’ utility is u(i)= w̄S and for i≥ i
∗, utility is u(i)≥ w̄S and
e=0. Steps (D) and (D) imply that high types who choose e>0 must obtain utility equal to w̄S . Therefore the
only possible way to obtain higher utility is to choose e=0. The result then follows from step (D).
9. For workers i≥ i∗ (who choose e=0) the minimum wage in their support w(0,i) is weakly increasing in i.
This follows from the fact that w(0,i) solves µ(w;0,i)=0, and µ(w;0,i) is weakly increasing in w and weakly
decreasing in i by Condition 2.
10. If some type i≥0 who chooses e=0 is hired by a selective firm, this can only occur at the minimum wage in
worker i′s support w(0,i). To see this, consider a market (0,w) where a high type i≥λ is hired by a selective
firm θ < i setting χθ (i)=I(i≥θ ), and suppose µ(w;0,i)>0. This implies that there are i-type applicants in some
market (0,w−ǫ). As a result, firm θ could increase its profits by shifting demand to market (0,w−ǫ) using the
same selection rule.
11. There does not exist a market (0,w) with w>qL where all firms hire non-selectively. Suppose there were such a
market and let (0,w) be the highest-wage market where all firms hire non-selectively. All firms must make zero
profits in (0,w) and µ(w;0,i)= µ̄ for all i. Suppose µ̄>0. Consider a market (0,w−ǫ). For sufficiently small
ǫ>0, the pool of applicants is the same in markets (0,w−ǫ) and (0,w). Then all firms could make positive
profits by hiring in market (0,w−ǫ), contradicting (i). Hence we must have µ̄=0. This implies that there can
only be a single such market (0,w) where all firms hire non-selectively, and that all workers must obtain utility
of at least w in equilibrium. Let ī denote the highest i∈[λ,1] that applies to market (0,w). By zero profits and
w>qL , we must have ī>λ. To ensure that no firm wants to hire selectively in market (0,w), all firms θ ≤ ī must
at least make profits qH −w in equilibrium, i.e. they must hire high types in some market (e
′,w′) = (0,w) with
w′ ≤w. However, because all workers obtain utility of at least w, there cannot be any supply of workers in market
(e′,w′).
12. All types i> iH , who select e=0 by step (D), must be hired with probability 1 at w=qH . They cannot be hired
with positive probability above qH because no firm would hire at such a wage. Suppose some ĩ> iH is not hired




maximize profits by hiring selectively at the
lower bound of the support of the wages of worker i=θ , which is below qH by step (D). The total number of








−F̄ (iH )≥ ĩ− iH . The first inequality follows from the
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from the fact that f̄ (θ)≥1 for all θ ≥ iH . Moreover, generically the second inequality is strict. By Condition 1,
this implies µ(w;0,i)<0 for some worker i in this interval, a contradiction.
13. Consider first the case where the equilibrium is interior with i∗ < iH and let iS −λ denote the measure of high





w(0,i′)df̄ (i′)= w̄S (D.9)
with the cutoff i∗ defined in step (D) given by (D.6).
Suppose first that there exist workers in [λ,iH ] with lower bounds on wages lower than those defined by (D.9),





(a) If ĩ∈ (i∗,iH ] is in a region where f̄ (i) is strictly increasing, let w̃(0,i) be the lower bounds on the




={(e,w) :e=0,w= w̃(0,i),i∈ (ĩ−ǫ, ĩ)}. Firms θ ≤ ĩ−ǫ can

















given by (D.4). By




of them are hired by selective firms, and step (D) implies that the selective
hiring occurs at the lower bound of their wage w(0, ĩ+ε). (Since ĩ≤ iH , we have f̄ (ĩ+ε)≤1.) Taken




of workers ĩ+ε must be hired by non-selective firms at




of workers of type ĩ will be
hired by non-selective firms at wages at or above w(0, ĩ). Suppose first that w̃(0,i) is strictly increasing
in (ĩ−ǫ, ĩ). For each i∈ (ĩ−ǫ, ĩ), all workers i′ > i have lower bounds on wages w̃(0,i), so the supply of
workers in market (0,w̃(0,i)) includes i−iS high types and λ low types. Therefore (D.4) and the fact that
w̃(0,i)>w(0,i) imply that no firms want to hire non-selectively in any market (0,w̃(0,i)). Alternatively,




of workers of type ĩ will be
hired by non-selective firms at wages at or above w(0, ĩ), the same must then be true for all i∈ (ĩ−ǫ, ĩ]. In












dF̄ (i), which implies that µ(w̃(0,i);0,i)>0
for some workers i∈ (ĩ−ǫ, ĩ), and the lower bound on wages must be lower than w̃(0,i).
(b) If ĩ∈ (i∗,iH ] is in a region where f̄ (i) is constant or if ĩ< i
∗ then this implies that the lower bound on the
wages of worker ĩ is higher than that of some worker i′ > ĩ, which would violate step (D).
(c) If ĩ= i∗, this would imply that some workers i∈[λ,i∗] have a lower bound on their wage w̃(0,i)>wS .
This can only occur without violating step (D) when i∗ corresponds to the lower end of a bunching
region and wS <w(0,i
∗). Let i′ be the lowest i∈[λ,i∗] such that w̃(0,i)>wS for all i> i
′. We must
have i′ >λ since otherwise no one signals by (D.9). No firm θ < i′ wants to hire any type i> i′ since
they maximize profits by hiring in market (0,wS). Hence, total selective hires in (i
′,i∗) are given by
F(i∗)−F(i′)≤ F̄(i∗)−F̄(i′)< i∗ −i′. The first inequality follows from the fact that, since i∗ is the lower
end of a bunching region, we have F(i∗)= F̄(i∗). The second follows from the definition of iH and the
fact that i∗ < iH . Since there is no non-selective hiring (if there was, step (D) would apply), this implies
that µ(w̃(0,i),0,i)>0 for some workers i∈ (i′,i∗), and therefore the lower bound on wages must be
lower than w̃(0,i).
Suppose next that there exist workers with lower bounds on wages lower than those defined by (D.9), and let ĩ














with a lower bound
on wages w′ <
[




i′ − iS +λ
]
and consider the market (0,w′). The supply of workers in




who do not signal
(a measure at least i′ − iS). Therefore, a firm that hired non-selectively in market (0,w
′) would make
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is in a region [i0,i1] where f̄ (i) is constant, then a fraction 1− f̄ (i1) of all workers i< i1 are













, with strict inequality in the generic case where the original density f is not
exactly constant and equal to f̄ (i1). For all these firms, it is profit maximizing to hire selectively at the
lower bound on wages of worker i=θ , which implies that µ(w;0,i)<0 for some i in this interval, and
which therefore cannot be part of an equilibrium.
(c) If ĩ< i∗ then equation (D.6) implies that the utility of all workers i≤ ĩ is below w̄S . By (D.9) and (D.8),
they would be better off choosing e=eS .
14. In any interior equilibrium, the cutoff i∗ defined in step (D) must also satisfy (D.7). To see this, observe first that
not all workers i∈[λ,i∗] can possibly signal. If this were the case, consider the beliefs of a firm θ ∈[λ,i∗) in a
market (0,wS +ε). Then G(Iχθ ;0,wS +ε,χθ )>0 since otherwise µ(wS +ε;0,i)=0 for i∈[λ,i
∗) by Condition 5,
so these workers could get payoff in excess of w̄S by choosing e=0 instead of signalling. Moreover, the support
of G(·;0,wS +ε,χθ ) cannot include high types since otherwise some firms could increase their profits by shifting
demand to market (0,wS +ε) for ε sufficiently small. Hence, for all firms θ ∈[λ,i
∗), it is profit maximizing to hire
selectively in market (0,wS), so total selective hires will be F (i
∗)= F̄(i∗), where the equality follows from the fact
that, by (D.6), if i∗ falls in a bunching region, it corresponds to the lower end of it. On the other hand, the measure of
workers who are not hired by non-selective firms at higher wages is f̄ (i∗)(i∗ −iS). Hence, if F̄(i










for some i in this interval, so wS cannot be the lower bound on wages.
15. For the case of a corner equilibrium, note first that Ŵ(iH ,iH −F(iH ))<0 implies w(0,iH )<w
P, where we used
f̄ (iH )=1 (abstracting from the trivial case iH =λ, which is fully characterized by step (D)). Together with steps
(D) and (D), this means that there cannot be any non-selective hiring. Hence, uL =qL and eS =e
∗. Moreover,
since there are only F(iH ) firms with θ < iH that can hire selectively at e=0, this immediately implies that at least
a measure iS −λ= iH −λ−F(iH ) of workers must signal. All other workers in [λ,iH ] must have a lower bound
on wages wP . The bound cannot be lower than wP by step (D). Suppose for some workers the bound is higher and
let i′ be the lowest i∈[λ,iH ) such that w(0,i)>w
P for all i> i′. We must have i′ >λ since otherwise no-one would
signal. No firm θ < i′ wants to hire any type i> i′ since they maximize profits by hiring in market (0,wP). Hence,
total selective hires in (i′,iH ) are given by F(iH )−F(i
′)≤ F̄(iH )−F̄(i
′)< iH −i
′. The first inequality follows from
F(iH )= F̄(iH ) and the second from the definition of iH . Since there is no non-selective hiring, this implies that
µ(w(0,i);0,i)>0 for some workers i∈ (i′,iH ), and therefore wage w(0,i) cannot be the lower bound on their
wages.
16. By the same argument as in step (D), in the corner equilibrium not every worker with i< iH can signal. Moreover,
again by the same argument as in step (D), it is not possible that the measure iS −λ of workers who signal exceeds
iH −F(iH )−λ. Hence, together with the previous step, we must have iS = iH −F(iH ).
17. Finally, we show that there is a unique solution to equations (D.6) and (D.7). The argument in the proof of
Proposition (D.1) applies, except that, with bunching, the function (i∗) is no longer continuous. From (D.5)
we see that Ŵ is still continuous in iS but, as i increases, jumps up at the lower end of each bunching interval.
This is because when i enters a bunching region, ib(i) jumps to the upper end of that region. As a result,
(i)≡Ŵ(i,i−F̄(i)/f̄ (i)) is continuous in i except when i is the lower end of a bunching interval, in which
case (i) discontinuously jumps up at that point as i increases. Recall that the solution to (D.6) and (D.7)
is i∗ =mini∈[λ,iH ] {i|(i)≥0}. Together with the result from Proposition D.1 that 
′(i)>0 when i is not in a
bunching region and =0, this implies the following:
(a) If (iH )<0, then (i)<0 for all i∈[λ,iH ], so there cannot be any solution to (D.6) and (D.7) and the corner
equilibrium is the unique equilibrium.
(b) If (iH )≥0, then either (i)>0 for all i∈[λ,iH ], in which case i
∗ =λ, or there exists a unique solution
i∗ ∈ (λ,iH ]. Hence, if there is an interior equilibrium, it is also unique.
Existence We have established the existence of a solution to equations (D.6) and (D.7). We now provide the
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I(w≥qH ) if e=0, i≥ iH






e=0, i∈[i∗,iH ), w∈[w(0,i),w(0,iH ))
e=0, i∈[λ,i∗), w∈[wS,w(0,iH ))














1 if e=0, i≤ iH , w≥w(0,iH )
I(w≥ w̃(e,i)) if e>0, i≥λ


































w(0,i)df̄ (i) if i<λ
(c) Demand decisions:












(0,wS,χ (i)=I(i≥θ )) if θ ∈[λ,i
∗)
(0,w(0,θ ),χ (i)=I(i≥θ )) if θ ∈[i∗,iH )
(0,qH ,χ (i)=I(i≥θ )) if θ ∈[iH ,θ
∗)
(0,qL,χ (i)=1∀i) for a measure λ(1− f̄ (i
∗)) of firms θ ≥θ∗
(eS,qH ,χ (i)=1∀i) for a measure iS −λ of firms θ ≥θ
∗
where θ∗ is such that F(θ∗)−F(iH )=1−iH .
The non-selective demand in markets (0,w(0,i)) with i∈[i∗,iH ) and f̄
′(i)>0 remains to be specified. For a small
interval of types [i0,i0 +] the change in the probability of being hired non-selectively is:
f̄ (i0 +)− f̄ (i0)≈ f̄ ′ (i0)
Using that in a no-bunching region ir (w)=
iS (qH −w)+λ(w−qL)
qH −w
, this implies that total non-selective hires over an













Hence, the total measure of demand from firms θ ≥θ∗ using the non-selective hiring rule χ (i)=1∀i placed on




















All firms θ ≥θ∗ are indifferent between hiring in any of these markets and remaining inactive, for instance by
setting (eθ ,wθ ,χθ )= (0,0,χ (i)=1∀1).


























if e=0, w∈[w(0,iH ),qH ),θ < iH
I(i∈[max{iS ,θ},ir (w)])
ir (w)−max{iS ,θ}





w̃(e,λ),w̃(e,iH )),θ < iH
I(i≥θ)
1−θ
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if e=0, w∈[w(0,iH ),qH )
I(i<λ)+I(i∈[iS ,ir (w)])
λ+ir (w)−iS
if e=0, w∈[wS,w(0,iH ))
1
λ
I(i<λ) if e=0, w∈[qL,wS)
1
λ
I(i<λ) if e∈ (0,eS), w≥ w̃(e,0)
I(i∈[λ,iS ])
iS−λ
if e≥eS, w≥ w̃(e,λ)
∅ otherwise
To see that the proposed {ei,(eθ ,wθ ,χθ ),µ,G} is an equilibrium, note first that the probabilities defined in (b) imply that
low types are indifferent between any e∈ [0,eS] and high types are indifferent between any e, so the education decisions
defined in (a) solve the workers’ problem. The beliefs defined in (d) imply that it is profit maximizing for firms θ ≤ i∗ to
hire selectively in market (0,w=wS) and for firms θ ∈ (i
∗,iH ) to hire in market (0,w(0,θ )). Firms θ ≥ iH make zero profits
by hiring selectively in market (0,qH ). Moreover, firms θ ≥ iH make zero profits by hiring non-selectively in markets
(0,qL), (eS,qH ) or (0,w(0,i)), i∈[i




=0 or results in losses. Therefore
the demands defined in (c) are an optimal choice. Finally, using the above-specified demand and beliefs, Condition 1
holds. It is straightforward to verify that µ(w;e,i) given in (b) is weakly decreasing in i, so Condition 2 is also satisfied.
Beliefs satisfy Condition 3 in nonempty markets. In zero supply markets, beliefs are also constructed to satisfy Condition
4 when they are well defined, and G(·;e,w,χθ )=0 only at wages where µ(w;e,i)=0 for all i such that χ (i)=1, so
Condition 5 is satisfied as well.
Corner equilibrium.





0 if i<λ or i≥ iH −F(iH )
e∗ otherwise
(b) Demand decisions:












(0,wP,χ (i)=I(i≥θ )) for θ < iH
(0,qH ,χ (i)=I(i≥θ )) for θ ∈[iH ,θ
∗)
(0,qL,χ (i)=1∀i) for a measure λ of firms θ ≥θ
∗
(e∗,qH ,χ (i)=1∀i) for a measure iH −F(iH )−λ of firms θ ≥θ
∗
(0,0,χ (i)=1∀i) otherwise



















if e=0, i∈ [λ,iH ]
I(w≥qL) if e=0, i<λ
I(w≥ w̃(e,i)) if e>0, i≥λ
I(w≥min{w̃(e,i),w̃(e,λ)}) if e>0, i<λ





qH if i> iH
wP if i∈ [λ,iH ]
qL if i<λ


















I(i∈[max{iH −F(iH ),θ},iH ])
min{F(iH ),iH −θ}





w̃(e,λ),w̃(e,iH )),θ < iH
I(i≥θ)
1−θ
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I(i<λ)+I(i∈[iH −F(iH ),iH ))
λ+F(iH )










I(i<λ) if e∈ (0,e∗), w≥ w̃(e,0)
I(i∈[λ,iH −F(iH )])
iH −F(iH )−λ
if e≥e∗, w≥ w̃(e,λ)
0 otherwise
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